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INTRODUCTION 
Moral language presents an interesting case for analysis if a theorist's concerns are located around 
issues of meaning. It appears that what makes it interesting are the ways in which moral language is 
different from the language of some other known discourses. Meaning in the language of science, 
for instance, is much simpler, though not in content, certainly in terms of what we take scientific 
assertions to be doing. The simplicity of the meaning of scientific assertions is due to the fact that 
science exists in a well established paradigm over which there appears mostly to be consensus in 
terms of scientific language having literal meaning and forwarding objective truth. This consensus 
sees the linguistic behaviour within scientific discourse placing relatively (to moral language for 
instance) uncontroversial constraints on linguistic behaviour. Simply, we all expect the same thing 
from science: objectivity, precise representation of facts, valid deduction and careful induction and 
that version of truth which most people, who are not deeply involved in a critical discussion around 
truth, take truth to be: as something based on proof. When we make scientific assertions we simply 
want our assertions to be taken at face value and we present them as being true in the ways we have 
just mentioned. So, even though scientific truth is easily defined but hard to achieve, because of the 
standards set for such truth and the technical content of the language, the meaning of scientific 
language, by this view, remains relatively unproblematic. 
Literary, or metaphorical, language is as easily distinguished from moral language. The types of 
statements used in literature (poetry, novels, plays and other sorts of narrations) are used with 
specific intent. Literary language is characterised by its propensity to purposefully convey its 
content in such a way that it is not always overtly available to the reader or listener. This is not a 
fault of literary (metaphorical) language but is a defining characteristic thereof. However, as 
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interesting as literary theory is, it is not necessary, for the purpose of this thesis, to look very deeply 
at the intricacies of this discourse. The present point is merely to show, superficially, how moral 
language contrasts with that of literary language. The primary distinction between these two 
discourses, it seems, rests partially in the fact that metaphorical statements employ language not 
only as a means to convey content but also, formally; to showcase something of the particular 
structure of the language itself in conveying the content. The language is seen, so to speak, as an 
end in itself. Literary language is not merely a medium for conveying a message but is explicitly 
presented as a structure of which the value is determined by some sorts of aesthetic norms. Truth, 
in literature, then takes on another character altogether. And this fact, of truth taking on another 
form to, for instance, scientific truth, is not controversial either. 
In what way then is it being proposed that moral language is different to either of the preceding 
examples? And why does this difference present certain problems for theories about meaning in 
moral language? It is being proposed that there exists a tension between the use of moral assertions 
and what sort of truth moral language is, in fact, capable of. Unlike scientific language, which 
presents a case for congruency between use and the establishment of scientific truth, and 
metaphorical language which also presents a case of harmony between our use of such language 
and the expectations we have of it, moral language, it is being claimed, says one thing but does 
quite another. This tension, in a sense, between the means and ends of moral propositions, is what 
forms the foundation of the problem about meaning for moral language investigated in this thesis. 
It is the primary claim of this thesis that, in looking at the way in which we use moral language it is 
apparent that there is only one theory of meaning which can correctly capture our linguistic 
behaviour within moral discourse: a verificationist theory about meaning. But it is with complete 
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understanding of the sort of resistance to verificationist theories about meaning (particularly for 
discourses such as moral discourse) that an attempt is made to counter the usual objections to such 
a theory about meaning. It is my wish that the reader should assume (if there is a concern here) that 
there is present, in the nature of this thesis, a sensitivity towards Wittgensteinian notions of the 
inappropriateness of dealing with all discourses with the standards set by empirical sciences. The 
argument which constitutes this thesis, however, will be premised on [ironically] another 
Wittgensteinian notion: use. It will be argued that it is the indicative nature of moral language 
which has made it vulnerable to being measured by standards which clearly are not appropriate for 
it. The suggestion is that moral language insists on competing in an inappropriate category and is 
therefore being measured by the wrong tools. 
The intention then, needless to say, is not to offer a motivation for, or a way of, reforming human 
morality but rather to gain some clarity in what we take ourselves to be doing when making moral 
assertions and what meaning moral language is, in fact, apt for. The claim is that moral language 
should be regarded as assertoric, as this is the way in which it is used, but that the truth of moral 
assertions is indeterminate which, if meaning and truth are closely related, must translate into the 
meaning of moral language not being quite as settled as we should like it to be. 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
In chapter 1 I aim to dismiss the classical objection to the Verification Principle. This objection to 
verification theories about meaning reads: that the guiding thesis is not, itself, verifiable which 
makes verification theories about meaning self contradictory or at least theoretically unstable. 
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I propose, in chapter 1, to overcome the above problem for the meaning of the principle by 
discussing how the principle has framed itself by setting in place standards for meaning which 
require that propositions be verifiable. I shall argue that the principle cannot be known a posteriori 
because the extensions of the terms which it employs are not knowable via the senses. 
In section 2 it is proposed that the principle be regarded as an a priori knowable proposition 
because its terms are purely theoretical. I shall argue that the Verification Principle must be able to 
be analytically true (or true by definition). In looking at possible notions of "true by definition" I 
shall argue against Paul Horwich's rejection of implicit definition yielding a priori knowledge. His 
argument will be resisted by an appeal to an argument forwarded by Bob Hale and Crispin Wright 
which states that implicit definition can yield a priori knowledge if 1. implicit definition is properly 
understood and 2. if the class of propositions which are implicitly defined is correctly constrained. 
Section 3 will see an argument for the Verification Principle falling within the class of propositions 
which is implicitly defined if it is rephrased as a conditional statement. This is because speakers 
understand, a priori, that for a conditional to hold the relation of the concepts (within the antecedent 
and the consequent) must be a certain way. The verification condition(s) of the principle therefore 
becomes a positive proof of this relation. It will be argued that the project which sees the further 
proof of this conditional will be responsible for the explicit definition of the Verification Principle. 
By implication this means that a speaker who does not possess the necessary knowledge about why 
and how the conditional holds true cannot posses a real understanding (meaning) of the proposition 
which states the Verification Principle but that the principle is, indeed, verifiable. 
The central problem to which chapter 2 is addressed is that some of the disrepute that verificationist 
theories about meaning have enjoyed has been situated within the analytical tradition of 
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philosophy. This phenomenon seems to be a contradiction based on a serious misunderstanding of 
what verificationist theories propose and maybe even a misconception of the aims of analytical 
philosophy. Also, if it can be conclusively argued that sense should determine reference, this will 
provide a very effective basis for a further argument for Verificationism. 
In an effort to clarify this misconception about verificationist theories I shall, in section 1 of chapter 
2, outline what I see the motivations for the linguistic turn in philosophy are. In doing so it will be 
illustrated how closely associated verificationist theories about meaning, in particular, are with 
linguistic (analytical) philosophy. It will be argued that analytical philosophy and verificationist 
theories about meaning share the same aims: to "clean up" the language which we use to phrase the 
questions and solutions of our philosophical problems by appealing to the way in which speakers 
use language. 
In outlining, firstly, the difference between sense and reference, in section 2 of this chapter, it 
becomes clear that there are two salient ingredients to meaning. It will be argued, counter the 
possible adoption a position which regards meaning as entirely determined by rule following or 
something like the apt naming of objects in reality, that such a position regards only referencing as 
important to establishing the meaning of concepts and propositions. The additional claim is that this 
is the wrong way to think about meaning. The reason for this is; that sense ought to be regarded a 
salient ingredient of meaning, particularly within assertoric language, because we do not all 
understand a term in the same way, even while making reference to the same object and even if we 
share the same linguistic community adhering to the same linguistic rules. Regarding sense as a 
salient ingredient of meaning, it will be argued, is important for understanding what we are doing 
when making moral claims and forms part of why meaning should be determined by verification 
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conditions. The claim is that sense is closer (than referencing) to what we regard as the verification 
conditions of a proposition. 
Chapter 3 primarily addresses the problem which "use" of moral propositions raise for moral truth 
and meaning. The claim is that when we use language indicatively we are making claims to truth. 
Contrary to much philosophical deliberation about theories of truth the implied truth of indicative 
language is generally not regarded, by the individual speaker, as something different to the status of 
a proposition when it has effectively tracked a real and objective state of affairs. In the case of 
moral assertions we believe ourselves and others to have tracked moral facts. It is also the case that 
speakers think it important that the person who is making the claim can show how they know 
something they have said is true. It is, therefore, problematic that some meaning theories do not 
take this need for evidence into account. 
My continued attempt at building a case for a verificationist theory about meaning sees chapter 3 
forcing a concession that speakers expect evidence in support of their and others' assertoric claims, 
including moral claims. This will be achieved by using two well developed theories (in sections 1 
and 2) around what speakers learn when they learn languages. In doing this it should become clear 
that our moral claims stand in need of further proof- but not because a philosophical theory about 
meaning says so but rather because linguistic behaviour requires this. 
Section 1 then addresses the manifestation requirement, which states that speakers require that, 
additional to making an assertion, they and others should be able to manifest how they know their 
claims have tracked the relevant facts. This forms part of what is the a priori distinction between 
facts and fallacies. The claim will be that theories about meaning that do not appeal to evidence 
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(verification conditions) as an aspect of meaning are guilty of overlooking an important aspect of 
what speakers intuitively regard as part of what they and others mean when they speak. It is my aim 
to show that moral language is also subject to this requirement and that, because of this 
requirement, moral language has a certain burden of proof. The overall conclusion of the thesis (not 
directly concluded within this chapter) is that moral language cannot meet this burden of proof 
because of the inability of moral agents to access the relevant facts. 
The acquisition requirement, as discussed in section 2 of chapter 3, is simply a requirement of proof 
of competency placed by speakers on linguistic activity. In other words, the central claim of the 
acquisition theory is that theories of meaning need to give an account of what it is when a speaker 
is a competent one because this is assumed, by linguistic societies, to be an integral part of learning 
a language. It is, therefore, necessary for the theories which attempt to describe how we derive 
meaning to take this requirement into account. I shall show that the acquisition requirement insists 
that the delineation between competent and incompetent speakers is that competent speakers can 
use language effectively to state the truth and this entails that achievement of truth is regarded as a 
practical achievement which must be evident to at least the speaker himself. Because the 
acquisition requirement is more than just being competent at rule following, the aim will be to 
illustrate that only verificationist theories about meaning can accommodate this requirement fully. 
The challenge borne from the manifestation and acquisition requirements for a verificationist 
theory about meaning is that Verificationism can still be resisted if truth is accepted to be evidence 
transcendent. In other words, if truth is not an epistemic notion then speakers are not required to be 
able to manifest the knowledge they have of the truth value of their propositions. Chapter 4 
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addresses this problem in the two sections available to it in the following way: a case for an 
evidentially constrained notion of truth. 
The first section then sees a discussion about truth as an epistemic notion. My argument will be that 
truth must be regarded as evidentially constrained because this is consistent with the way in which 
speakers use assertoric language and, therefore, also moral propositions. However, it will be my 
claim that the implication of accepting truth to be evidentially constrained is that the truth of all 
assertions is not determinable. The obvious reason: if the speaker does not have access to the 
evidence which shows the assertion to be either true or false then it seems wrong to think of the 
assertion as "either true or false". This section thus sees the beginning of an argument against the 
Principle of Bivalence. 
In section 2 I shall argue that an evidence transcendent notion of truth is one which makes no 
appeal to speaker cognition. My aim is to show that evidence transcendent truth gives rise to the 
Principle of Bivalence (which is a foundational premise of classical logic) because if the truth or 
falsity of a claim has nothing to do with access to evidence then it does, indeed, seem to be the case 
that all statements must, theoretically, be either true or false. The claim is that it is wrong to 
endorse classical logic in cases where we lack evidence because speakers (but maybe not some 
philosophers) simply do think of truth as something based on proof or evidence. Evidence is what 
gives rise to the delineation between claims to truths and falsities and, if meaning has anything to 
do with use, it seems that truth should remain construed as an epistemic notion. 
In Chapter 2 it would have been concluded that truth should be an epistemic notion. In chapter 3 it 
appears that this notion of truth has certain seemingly problematic consequences for meaning: If 
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truth is evidentially constrained then which discourses are still apt for truth? Surely an evidentially 
constrained notion of truth will severely limit what propositions are even, in principle, capable of 
ever being true. The most serious problem for the task at hand, being the defence of a verificationist 
theory about meaning, is naturally whether or not moral language is capable of truth. This is a 
particularly sensitive problem because moral agents are generally rather seriously committed to 
their moral beliefs and the ensuing statements which they then make. And if meaning and truth are 
in anyway co-dependent then this issue of truth aptness and truth itself will surely have a bearing 
on what meaning moral language can have. 
I propose to overcome these problems in the three sections of chapter 5, wherein I shall argue that 
moral language is indeed truth apt. This conclusion will be based on the fact that the basis for 
deciding the truth aptness of propositions should be metaphysically neutral. Additional to this 
metaphysically neutral basis there are some theoretical requirements. These theoretical 
requirements are that the discourse is assertoric and that the truth predicate is partially characterised 
by the Disquotational Schema. A further requirement is that such utterances are governed by norms 
of warranted assertibility. My intention is to illustrate that moral language does meet with such 
criteria. 
The starting point of section 2 is to show that meaning is generally regarded as determined by what 
would make a statement true. It will thus be assumed to be relatively uncontroversial that there is a 
positive relationship between truth and meaning. It will be illustrated how some theories about 
meaning appeal to truth conditions and others, such as Verificationism, appeal to verification 
conditions. The argument will be that an epistemic notion of truth requires meaning to be 
determined by verification conditions because this is exactly what is entailed by an epistemic 
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notion of truth: that truth/falsity is only conferred when the speaker has knowledge of the evidence 
which would make the proposition so. It will be shown that a further implication of occupying this 
theoretical position is that the truth value of some claims are not determinate. Lastly, I shall argue 
that if the truth value of moral language is indeterminate, and meaning is determined by the 
conditions which would make a proposition true, then the meaning of moral language must also be 
indeterminate. 
The task of section 3, in addressing the above problems for meaning in moral language, is to 
propose that semantic anti-realism is the correct semantic theory to endorse for moral language. 
The reason for this is that it is impossible to be a moral realist and simultaneously subscribe to an 
epistemic notion of truth. It would have already been concluded in the previous chapter that an 
epistemic notion of truth is the only notion of truth consistent with our linguistic behaviour when 
making moral assertions. Since it has not been effectively shown (to my satisfaction) how speakers 
and moral agents will come by (know) things like objective moral facts, and knowledge of such 
facts would be necessary for endorsing moral realism within an evidentially constrained truth, 
moral realism must be resisted. It is my claim that semantic anti-realism seems to present all the 
right sort of qualities for a semantic theory about moral language. 
The last chapter of this thesis looks at some serious objections to some of the central tenets of 
Verificationism. I take Expressivism to be one of the most effective theories at resisting some of 
the salient premises of verificationist theory. If Expressivism is right about moral language not 
being in the business of making true or false statements this does not bode well for our previous 
claims about the truth aptness of moral language. At least not the sort of aptness for truth that 
verificationist theories endorse. And if Expressivism is right about moral statements being merely 
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expressions of our attitudes, dispositions and passions then Verificationism must be wrong about 
the assertoric nature of moral language. Chapter 6 asks and answers: What then can we take to be 
the case about moral language? 
An argument in support of the correctness of Verificationism (as contrasted with Expressivism) 
sees me reasoning, in section 1, as follows: In Chapter 5 I have stated a commitment to some 
criteria for truth aptness. One of these criteria is that theories about what language is apt for truth 
must start from a metaphysically neutral basis. My claim here is that Expressivism is 
metaphysically loaded, in other words, it reveals a metaphysical bias at the foundations of the 
theory. This metaphysical presupposition has the form of assuming that there are no moral facts 
which our propositions can track. I shall argue that, according to the previously endorsed criteria 
for theories about meaning, Expressivism is just not doing its work properly and its conclusions 
about the truth aptness of moral language are simply not to be taken seriously. 
Section 2 then continues by claiming, based on the fact that it is wrong to presuppose anything 
about a metaphysical state of affairs, or to conclude with any certainty anything about the truth of 
some existential claims (such as ones about the existence of moral facts), without evidence it seems 
wrong to say that moral claims are not genuine assertions. Surely the criteria for whether or not a 
claim is an assertion are, firstly, its logical form and, secondly, the intention with which it is used? 
My reasoning will be that moral agents make moral claims with the full and conscious intent of 
stating moral truths. My argument will run as follows: Expressivists may be right, on some 
psychological level, about what in fact happens when we make moral claims, but this is not helpful 
for a theory about meaning because we mean for, and therefore claim to understand, our moral 
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statements to be doing a certain type of work. And I doubt if any moral agent would be willing to 
admit that this is the expression of a passion or disposition. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A serious challenge to the Verification Principle: Has the Verification Principle rendered 
itself meaningless by its own standards? 
Chapter 1 addresses, what would probably be regarded as the most serious challenge to 
verificationist theories about meaning: that the Verificationist Principle is itself meaningless 
because, by its own standards, it must but cannot be verified. It is very important that this chapter is 
not seen as a defense of what the principle proposes: that meaning should be determined by 
verification conditions. Chapter 1 serves as an attempt to address a very long standing, nearly 
classical, objection to the Verification Principle itself, and that is that it has fallen on its own sword. 
Section 1 of this chapter outlines exactly how the Verification Principle has framed itself. In other 
words, what exactly is it maintaining about meaning when it says that meaning should be derived 
from verification conditions and not truth conditions? The primary argument forwarded in this 
chapter is that the Verification Principle is not meaningless. It will thus be the initial task to make 
explicit exactly how the objection, that the principle itself cannot be verified and must therefore be 
meaningless, runs. The task of section 1 of this chapter will sketch how the principle has apparently 
"framed" itself. It then is the work of the sections 2 and 3 respectively to counter this objection. In 
offering a way of resisting the objection I shall forward different ways in which the principle can 
have meaning and shall, by critical engagement with a few possibilities, rule out the ones which are 
not appropriate and endorse one particular way in which the principle could have meaning, which is 
also consistent with what it itself proposes about meaning. In section 2 I rule out the possibility that 
the principle be understood as an a posteriori statement. This, it will be argued, is for the obvious 
reason that it does not make reference to empirical content. Section 2 then does a minor survey of a 
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few possible ways of understanding the a priori in order to establish whether or not the principle 
can meet its own criteria for meaningfulness if it were regarded an a priori statement. This is an 
unapplied section as the survey is done with very little reference to the principle itself, the aim 
being to establish, firstly, how the a priori should be construed. I shall rule out the legitimacy of the 
synthetic a priori and also make a case, counter Quine, for the analytic. Both these arguments, 
against the synthetic a priori and for the analytic, are typical positions occupied by verificationist 
theories and the relevance of this should become clear throughout the rest of the thesis. In 
particular, this section will see an investigation of Paul Horwich's argument against definition 
yielding any sort of knowledge; that we can know anything from definition. This claim will be 
resisted by appealing to the argument Wright and Hale make for why certain forms of implicit 
definition can yield knowledge. The reason why I have seen fit to resist Horwich's argument 
against meaning preceding knowledge is that there do seem to be some very particular cases, be it a 
small class, which can be construed as implicitly defined and able to yield knowledge and that, 
furthermore, this would be an appropriate way of understanding the Verification Principle. 
It will be concluded, in section 3, that the principle be regarded as meaningful in the same way as 
any other principle forwarded as some sort of guiding thesis. In other words, it is maintained that 
the Verification Principle is normative in nature in the same way as any other principle whether 
scientific or moral. The Verification Principle is normative about how we ought to determine 
meaning. In using Hale and Wright's argument it will be shown how exactly principles are to be 
understood and that, in rephrasing the principle as a conditional statement, the Verification 
Principle can be shown to have verification conditions which can be met and, hence, does have 
meaning. 
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The general aim of the first chapter of the thesis is to put to rest the reader's concerns around a 
thesis which is proposing to endorse a theory about meaning which has been widely discredited 
based on the incoherence of its own guiding thesis. It will be the work of the rest of the thesis, once 
this major objection has been laid to rest, to defend what the Verification Principle poses about 
meaning. 
It seems as if it is impossible to forward any complete and serious sort of defense for 
Verificationism without addressing this classic and enduring criticism against it: The proposition 
which articulates the Verification Principle cannot have any meaning because it cannot, itself, be 
verified. When the principle states that meaning is verification conditions it must surely, on pain of 
contradiction and complete self annihilation, be able to show that it meets its own standards for 
meaning? It is, after all, a proposition which is making a claim about something, and is assumed to 
be meaningful and to be stating something true. Any proponent of verificationism, or any other 
theory of meaning, will require that its central tenet is regarded as meaningful before the work of 
proving the validity of such a project can be embarked on. So, before we can start looking at how 
this principle, in fact, does prescribe how meaning should be derived it must be shown how it is 
itself to be understood. It is only the latter with which this chapter is concerned. 
The verification principle, as specified by A. J. Ayer reads something like this: A sentence has 
literal meaning if, and only if, the proposition it expresses is either analytically or empirically 
verifiable (1970; 5). Clearly, logical positivism, of which Ayer was a proponent, only endorsed 
these two types of literal meaning (analytical and empirical). It should be said that other types of 
meaning, outside the sphere of analytical and empirical meaning, were regarded as possible by the 
positivists but were not of primary concern to a positivistic theory of meaning. The verification 
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principle was intended to be a guiding thesis for the sorts of claims which intended to be saying 
something literally true (factual), which emerges in the shape of assertoric language, but which, for 
several reasons, according to the logical positivists, was not always in the legitimate shape for some 
specified discourses, such as moral discourse. It is, therefore, quite simply, a waste of any sort of 
philosophical effort to accuse the verification principle of rendering, for instance, blatantly 
metaphorical language meaningless. The principle does not have anything, directly, to say about 
literature, poetry and other such language. But it does have something to say about moral language 
because of its assertoric facade. 
Even though, in defence of the meaningfulness of the principle, much could be made of the fact 
that it is not the term "meaningful" which has been employed in the aforementioned articulation of 
the principle, but rather "literal meaning", this will not be employed as part of the strategy for 
showing that the proposition, which states the verification principle, does have meaning. In other 
words, one of the lines of defence that could be taken would be to show that the principle has 
metaphorical meaning and, therefore, does not need to be verifiable. 
But the particular version of verificationism which will be under investigation here is not that of the 
Logical Positivists but rather its more contemporary manifestation, the verification theory of 
philosophers such as Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright. In Truth and other Enigmas Dummett 
speaks of the logical positivists switching from an explanation of meaning in terms of truth 
conditions (those conditions which, if they obtain, would make a statement true) to verification 
conditions (the conditions under which the content of a statement would be verified by the speaker) 
(1978; 421). This switch alludes to the precise difference there is between knowing what conditions 
would make a proposition true or false (truth conditions) and knowing how these conditions would 
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be obtained (verification conditions). If this is what is meant by verification conditions then it must 
be shown what the verification conditions of the principle itself are. Either this, or it must be shown 
in what other way the principle is meaningful which can still be endorsed by the principle itself. 
This is, if not entirely impossible, no easy task. 
It is not hard to see that there is absolutely no manner in which the principle can be regarded as an 
empirical proposition. This observation is based on the fact that none of the terms employed by the 
principle has the kind of literal extension which can be regarded to be of the empirical kind. The 
extension of "meaning" and "verification conditions" is just not the type we can know via our 
sensory equipment. This is, of course, because they are theoretical terms. In fact, the extensions of 
such terms are as contentious, and probably for the same reasons, as the possibility of numbers 
having any sort of real extension and this, we know, is a polemic as old as the realist/anti-realist 
debate about abstract entities. (Realism and anti-realism are terms discussed, further on in the 
thesis, in greater detail but for present purposes it is best to understand them thus: the realism of 
concern in this project should be construed as a semantic theory stating that meaning by an appeal 
to truth conditions and anti-realism states that meaning is derived by way of a statement's 
verification conditions.) The Verification Principle is in the same position, in terms of meaning, as 
other principles which employ theoretical terms. In order to save a principle such as the 
Verification Principle, which is a guiding thesis of anti-realist semantic theory, from being deemed 
meaningless it will have to be shown that speakers can manifest knowledge of the content of terms 
employed within the given statement. So, looking at the positivistic proposition, that only 
analytically true and empirically true claims are capable of literal meaning, leaves us with 
analyticity as the only option describing the nature of the principle. However, it should be 
conceded, at this point, that the principle is by no means regarded as self-evidently true as for 
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instance, "bachelors are unmarried men". If it were, there would be no need for an argument of the 
kind in this chapter to be made- unless one is skeptical, maybe in a sort of Quinian sense, about the 
possibility of analytical truths altogether. But that would require a more general sort of argument 
against the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
Since the analyticity of the principle cannot be taken for granted, and is in need of some sort of 
careful explanation, this chapter will, in part, direct its attention towards the study of the a priori. It 
should be easy to understand why an investigation of the a priori is necessary for determining what 
exactly the analytic is capable of. It is because it is directly related to understanding where the 
traditional link between the a priori and the analytic still holds, whether implicit definition (a proper 
explanation follows in the last section of this chapter) can play a role in any form of a priori 
knowledge and, in the light of the strong link between meaning and truth, as proposed by the 
verification thesis, whether there is such a thing as a priori knowledge at all. The general purpose of 
this chapter will be to show what the a priori can legitimately encompass. Seeing as we cannot, a 
posteriori, know the truth value of this principle the a priori remains the only possibility. 
Section 1: The framing of the principle 
How then, according to the critics of Verificationism, has the principle shot itself in the foot? If it is 
true that the world is not a totality of objects, but rather of facts (and facts are not construed as 
matters of fact but rather as bits of knowledge speakers have), then it must be the case that the 
world only is what we can know. In a sense this statement proposes that the world can only be to us 
what we know it to be. This Wittgensteinian principle bears many far reaching implications for 
those who accept it as true. Or, more correctly, those who have accepted it as true must presuppose 
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some other truths. Why? Because it seems wrong to accept such a statement, and carry it as some 
sort of maxim or linguistic rule, without first having drawn some other valid conclusions about the 
nature of things. In saying that the world only consists of facts it seems only reasonable to deduce 
that it is wrong to speak of facts in the absence of knowledge or access to matters of fact. Such a 
construal of "facts" does not mean that we have constructed the world, as in some radical version of 
idealism, but merely that making reference to a part of the world, an object in it or property of it, 
which is not also a fact (is manifested to us as knowledge of that object or property) seems like an 
entirely unsubstantiated reference to make. This does not entail that no objects besides the referents 
of our language or extensions of our terms and propositions exist. But what it does entail is that the 
world that we can legitimately make reference to is knowable and exists to us, in other words, as 
facts. 
Bob Hale in his essay, Realism and its Oppositions, (1997; pp 271), speaks about the Acquisition 
Challenge (page 68) to realism. The challenge states that our training in using any language entails 
us being taught that we can only think of statements as true or false if certain conditions obtain 
(1997; pp 275). When we use language which we assume to be representational we are faced with 
disputes about truth because we intend to be making assertions about reality and are aiming to do 
so correctly. So, if the Acquisition theory is stating a general truth about how we acquire language, 
and what we assume the role of language is, then it does seem that a situation exists in which the 
relationship of terms to their referents needs to be qualified by the speaker. Simply, if language is 
indeed representational the truth of the propositions we make will lie in whether or not we can 
know the extensions of the terms in question. Hence, a representational view of language is 
committed to a view that the legitimacy of assertions is derived from the area of direct and accurate 
overlap of propositions and states of affairs. The Acquisition Challenge to realism (p 68) holds that 
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we assume that it is this area which determines whether or not we are stating something true or 
false. 
If the Acquisition Challenge is correct about the conditions we place on establishing whether or not 
we are competent language users, the meaning of the principle cannot, unfortunately, appeal to 
realist truth conditions. This is because verificationist theory, and therefore also its guiding 
principle, must appeal to more than truth conditions for determining meaning; and this is 
verification conditions. The truth conditions of the principle will consist in knowing what would 
have to obtain for a statement to be true. This is a particularly realist stance on meaning and truth in 
language. If this was all that was necessary for the Verification Principle to be have literal meaning 
then this project would have come to an end right now, because we certainly can understand the 
proposition which states the principle and this is because we know what would have to obtain in 
order for the principle to be true: that meaning is, in fact, determined by verification conditions. 
We, therefore, in the case of endorsing truth conditions, could safely say that it does have literal 
meaning. So for the Verification Principle to have literal meaning, in realist terms, we just require 
an understanding of what it would take for the statement to obtain, and that it itself is verifiable, 
and an actual understanding and acceptance of the proposition itself (as legitimately part of a 
particular language community). 
But the principle is informed by an evidentially constrained notion of truth. This states that truth 
should be construed as the status of a proposition when the speaker can show what knowledge they 
have in support of the content of the claim. This entails that the principle cannot help itself to 
realist conditions for meaning. In other words, it cannot save itself from meaninglessness by 
claiming that meaning is determined by truth conditions. It does seem, at this stage, as if the 
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principle has framed itself in a rather onerous way. If the principle is to have the sort of literal (and 
evidentially constrained; p 84) truth it prescribes for other specific types of propositions, it must be 
able to qualify and detect what objects it is making reference to. 
It should be noted that there is a fundamental and very important difference between proving the 
principle false, in the sense that it is a disproved theory, and saying that it does not have literal 
meaning. Hence, it seems that the objector, whose project it is to show that the principle is false, 
must at least presuppose that it is meaningful. Because meaningful sentences can also have the 
value of falsity which means that if we find the principle to be false it is not necessarily 
meaningless. In fact, if meaning is determined by verification conditions, and it emerges that the 
principle is false, it must have been put through a process of testing for the conclusion of it being 
false to have been established. This means that it must have had verification conditions and must 
therefore have meaning of some kind. However, the objector whose project begins with the 
meaningfulness itself of the proposition will not need to, if it has been shown to be meaningless or 
have something like metaphorical meaning only, continue with proving the principle a false one. 
The damage would have been done in successfully questioning the meaning alone. It is with the 
aim of dispelling this objection that this chapter concerns itself. 
If the principle claims that we establish the meaning of a proposition only by the evidence we have 
in support of the extensions of the terms employed (which we need to establish via our sense of the 
terms) then we have come up, squarely, against an epistemological problem: The challenge is to 
determine what sort of epistemology the principle has in support of its own claim, and whether this 
epistemology is of the right type to redeem the intention of the literal meaning of the claim itself. 
The principle clearly is not a claim of the a posteriori kind and it will, therefore, be the task of the 
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next section to address the a priori and what we can conclusively know about and within this form 
of knowledge. 
It does seem as if the meaning of the principle is not as immediately problematic when the principle 
is seen as stating an analytical proposition. This is because the terms employed by an analytical 
claim need not, for the establishment of its truth, be shown to make reference to an object external 
to the proposition itself. It is for this reason that it has already been stated that the principle has a 
better chance at survival if regarded as a statement knowable a priori, capable of analytic truth. 
Section 2: The A Priori 
It seems, in looking at some of the controversies surrounding a priori knowledge, that it would be a 
mistake to assume anything about it. It would probably be fair to say that it is Quine's questioning 
of the possibility of purely a priori knowledge by his dissolution of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction which has done much of the damage to the classical Kantian distinctions. But it should 
be cautioned, from the onset, that a successful argument against a Quinian notion of the classical 
epistemological categories will not necessarily align one entirely and completely with a purely 
Kantian conception of these categories, and neither will a rejection of Kantian epistemology make 
one, by necessity, a Quinian depending on the reasons for taking a particular position about such 
matters in every sense or any sense of the word. Conclusions depend on reasons and this means that 
one could find oneself, depending on the reasons for adopting a particular position about such 
matters, just about anywhere outside of these two positions. 
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Some of the challenges which face the a priori, as outlined in the introduction to New Essays on the 
A Priori, are that there are no satisfactory explanations of how propositions can be known without 
experience, that the growth of scientific knowledge refutes the existence of a priori truths, that no 
proposition can have the property of non-defeasibility and, of course, Quine's objection to the a 
priori. Quine's objection runs something like this; that the notion of the a priori would only be valid 
if truth is something like grasping meaning but seeing as nothing can be true by meaning alone 
(because he denies the category of analytical truth and truth by meaning would have to be, 
according to Quine, of the analytical kind) there is, simply, no purely a priori knowledge. Quine's 
objections are based on one theme and that is that a priori truth is non-empirical and any attempt to 
determine the meaning of propositions, which is not contingently dependent on the holistic 
environment in which the proposition occurs, is misguided because such an appeal depends on the 
truth of analytical necessity (non-defeasibility) and analytical necessity is just not a possibility for 
any sort of proposition. The reasons Quine gives for rejecting necessary truth is based in his 
arguments for holistic theories about meaning. These arguments are complex and it is not necessary 
to look at them in too much detail here. It is, however, important to understand, for our purposes, 
that what was in non-Quinian terms regarded as a purely logical statement e.g. "All bachelors are 
unmarried men" is, apparently, according to Quine, revisable. The implication, evidently, of 
accepting Quine's views is that it remains a possibility to find a bachelor who is a married man or 
someone who is a man, unmarried and yet not a bachelor. We shall take a brief look, further on, at 
how seriously we should take Quine's proposal. 
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1. A priori claims as more than logical truths 
Since the aim is to rule out the possibility of the Verification Principle being a synthetic a priori 
statement it is useful to start by looking at how we are best to understand this category of 
knowledge. And clarity about categories of knowledge is important for understanding what 
meaning is when it is being proposed that meaning is evidentially constrained, which is what the 
principle claims. The synthetic a priori is knowledge about the empirical world which we, it is 
claimed, can know before (or outside of) experience. So, in terms of truth, the synthetic a priori will 
yield truth which is not a purely logical truth, but is self-evident in the same way as a logical truth 
would be. This is a much disputed category of knowledge, rejected outright by philosophers from 
any empiricist tradition. Very crudely put, Kant, as a rationalist, needed to allow for a category of 
knowledge which still only depended on reason but could yield knowledge about the world and 
existence. In other words, it is necessary to permit a category of knowledge which legitimises 
metaphysical or ethical claims without an appeal to experience if rationalists want to be able to say 
something about reality. Let us look at an example of the sort of reasoning which is claimed to give 
us information about the world without an appeal to experience, in other words, synthetic truths 
yielded by a priori reasoning alone: 
PI: All fathers are male 
P2: Some fathers have daughters 
I 
C1: Therefore, some males have daughters 
Admittedly, this argument is a valid argument depending entirely, for its validity, on the a priori 
rules of inferential reasoning. But is it true that it gives us information about the world because of 
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its structural validity? Before we answer this question I shall raise another example with which to 
contrast our father-daughter example: 
P1: All higher beings are benevolent 
P2: God is a higher being 
i 
CI: Therefore, God is benevolent. 
Now, it seems, on closer inspection, that the first argument would be deductively true irrespective 
of what the extensions of the terms "father", "daughters" and "males" are. So, it would make no 
difference if we replaced those terms with terms such as "A", "B" and "C" because the argument 
would still be a priori and valid but it would then, quite evidently, not be giving us information 
about the world. But the very reason why the first argument does say something about the world is 
because P2 is an empirical claim and can be such because of the nature of the referents. It is, 
therefore, not the father-daughter argument's supposed a priori nature which is yielding 
information about the world, but rather its a posteriori content in P2 and the reasoning that then 
follows from this a posteriori claim as well as the empirical nature of the other references made. 
If it is still claimed that the first argument is maybe stating something true about the world because 
of the validity of its structure alone, it may be useful to look at the second argument and where it is 
similar or different to the first. The God argument, even though equally valid in structure, cannot 
yield information about the world. Why not? Some of the terms employed within this argument, 
such as "God" and "higher being", cannot ever be fixed (and this stands as a challenge to those who 
believe they can be), in this world, to a specific and, knowable by experience, referent. In other 
words the speaker will be unable to yield any knowledge of an empirical nature of the sense (that 
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aspect of a term which represents what we understand in using that term; p 52) of the term. This 
argument is purely deductive by nature but has the assertoric structure of a claim stating a synthetic 
truth. This means that it is attempting to state something true about the existence but does not allow 
for any way in which we can access evidence about the synthetic content it puts forward. The 
reason why it does not allow access to evidence is because it makes no determinate (as in 
determinable by the speaker) a posteriori claims. We simply cannot access any of the evidence 
needed to establish whether the argument is not merely valid but also sound. But it will be claimed 
by some that a successful counter-argument to the "god-argument" does not settle the illegitimacy 
of whole class of the synthetic, a priori truths. What we can conclude thus far is, if truth is 
construed as an epistemic (knowable by the speaker) notion, then we have here a case of 
indeterminate truth because we cannot manifest any actual knowledge of what would make the 
proposition true or false. We merely have here two cases of deductive reasoning yielding valid 
conclusions. But without the further epistemic support of the existential claims we cannot claim to 
have said anything about the contingent world. 
But why should we reject the whole synthetic a priori class just because the example above is not 
acceptable? And if it transpires that some species of the synthetic a priori is legitimate then it will 
need to be shown whether or not the principle can be thus saved from its critics. Let's assume that 
the first argument (the father-daughter one) is still maintained to be an example of the synthetic a 
priori, but it is claimed that the second is not valid for whatever reason. I propose that, on insisting 
that the first argument does conclude a synthetic truth of some kind on purely a priori terms, a 
commitment is required in accepting that the second does, or can, too. In other words, it is not 
possible to draw a logical or even relevant distinction between the two arguments above. The 
distinction would have to be the recognition of the premises of the first argument having truth 
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values. Added to this recognition is the fact that the conclusion that the first argument draws 
represents a case of a posteriori knowledge and this is what allows for the first to be stating a 
synthetic truth. 
The aim here is to show that an unrestricted rejection of the synthetic a priori seems like the right 
way to go. The reason is that accepting that we can sometimes know things about the real world in 
an a priori fashion will make it very difficult for any theorist to place constraints (if they do not 
wish to allow unconstrained use of the synthetic a priori) on what can legitimately be known in this 
way. If, however, the claim is that an epistemic notion of truth can solve this dilemma by posing as 
the constraint on what can be true within the category of synthetic, a priori propositions, we will 
find that we have merely gone full circle; when truth is evidentially constrained it appears that talk 
of the synthetic a priori is not valid anymore- propositions (such as the premises of the arguments 
in question) which state something about the world but depend on evidence to establish their truth 
values will not be of the a priori kind. Quite simply, and rightly so, we are then merely dealing with 
synthetic a posteriori claims. It, therefore, seems a more epistemologically "hygienic", and 
theoretically superior, option to keep the analytic, a priori and synthetic, a posteriori absolutely 
separate. 
In rejecting the synthetic a priori as a legitimate form of knowledge we have eliminated the 
possibility of the Verification Principle being verifiable in this way. It is the next project to 
establish whether or not the principle can be saved as a purely analytical claim. It is my opinion 
that a serious look at the legitimacy of the analytic is not complete without a look at Quine's 
arguments against this class of statements. It will be the conclusion that Quine is wrong in rejecting 
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the analytic and that there are cases wherein we can know things by meaning alone- but that this 
class is of a very particular type and generally severely restricted. 
2. The analvticity of a priori claims 
Which categories of the a priori remain then? The following question to be addressed is whether or 
not, if the a priori cannot yield synthetic truths, all a priori statements are analytical? 
There are not many philosophers who would not first think of Quine when questioning the analytic. 
Quine reasons, in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, that there is no real distinction between the analytic 
and synthetic and claims that the absence of this distinction must also dissolve the a priori category 
of knowledge. Quine states that if the a priori were to be valid it would have to be something like 
grasping meaning. But Quine's skepticism about the possibility of grasping anything by meaning 
alone commits him to a rejection of the a priori- and this, clearly, is because he rejects purely 
analytical truths. The question remains whether or not he is right about all of this. 
When we say that something is true by meaning alone we are claiming that the proposition 
attributes no more to the subject of the proposition than is already contained within the concept of 
the subject itself. Mostly, this definition of the analytic is accepted as the right one and it is also 
regarded, generally, that some propositions are capable of being analytically true. The argument 
against the notion of necessary meaning (also referred to by Quine as synonymy) is: A predicate is 
aptly used if it is true of the extension of the term. (Quine speaks about extensions as the things or 
properties which words refer to.) Yet, it is possible that two different predicates can be aptly used 
of the same extension and not have the same meaning as each other. An example would be: "A 
bachelor is an unmarried man" and "A bachelor is a man who has never had a wife". This example, 
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according to Quine, shows that, even though both predicates may be true of the subject "bachelor", 
the predicates are not synonymous in meaning. When we have a case of two predicates sharing the 
same extension but do not necessarily have the same meaning they cannot be said to be 
interchangeable because of meaning, but should rather be said to be interchangeable because of 
matters of fact. In other words, the above example shows the predicates "...is an unmarried man" 
and ".. .is a man who has never had a wife" as interchangeable because they both refer to the same 
thing not because they share the same meaning. And this, according to Quine (1953; 29) can only 
be true if language is extensional (refers to objects or properties) and an account of cognitive 
synonymy (knowledge that two terms do refer to the same object or property) can be given. And 
according to Quine things are only known to be synonymous when we have empirical access to the 
referents. Interchangeable meaning is therefore still a matter of synthetic knowledge. 
Quine's argument sees a move towards a holism about meaning. It is for this reason that he chooses 
to use the notion of two "synonymous" propositions to show how meaning can never be 
interchangeable based purely on the terms employed. Quine states that analytically true sentences 
are only possible if all propositions are independent of each other because if propositions exist 
within a conceptually binding network, which they do according to Quine, we cannot be sure from 
meaning alone what the extensions of the terms are. Presumably the reason is something like 
knowing that "angel" refers to "divine being" does not tell us anything about the extension of either 
term. It is for this reason that synthetic knowledge must determine the meaning of terms and 
propositions. 
Another example serving as a reason for Quine's rejection of the a priori is that of arithmetic laws 
in testing empirical data and the failing of testing usually being attributed to the data testing and not 
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laws itself. Quine reckons that it is not clear why the laws themselves should not be questioned. It 
is argued, counter Quine, that when the test fails it is not the law which is questioned, because it 
must be considered a priori true, but rather the datum itself, which is merely contingently true. The 
reason why this counter-argument is unsuccessful is that it does not answer Quine's question 
(Introduction to New Essays on the A Priori) regarding a priori rules. It merely states the exact 
point which he is in doubt of. In other words it begs the question. Quine asks: Should it not be, at 
least partially, the law which is questioned? What are the reasons we have in support of not 
doubting these laws and merely stipulating that they are indefeasible? And does this assumption of 
the unrevisability of the "analytic" not result in a false idea of what knowledge is contingent and 
what not? Defeasibility issues (which sorts of knowledge and reasons are logically certain and 
which are revisable or falsifiable) are central to objections to and defenses of the a priori. It seems 
that it is the notion of any knowledge being unrevisable which often underwrites a rejection of the a 
priori. 
Quine has presented us with an argument which rules out the analytic based on skepticism about 
meaning. This skeptical argument is premised on the fact, according to Quine, that language is only 
comprehensible because it is extensional. If Quine is right then the principle can only have meaning 
because of the extensions of the terms employed in its articulation. If Quine is wrong about his 
rejection of the analytic then this may yet remain a possibility for the meaning of the Verification 
Principle. 
The first thing that needs to be said against Quine is that propositions have, in fact, meaning 
separate to other propositions. In other words, it seems necessary to question Quine's doctrine of 
holism. We know this because a sentence such as, "Gypsies have a strange value system", has 
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meaning which is entirely derived by two means. Here I am referring to Bernhard Weiss's (pages: 
77-78) description of two pathways to meaning: The one is the aspect of meaning which is derived 
via inferential pathways, in other words, the aspects of meaning which we derive from 
understanding that word within a web of linguistic and reasoning activity. In this sense, it could be 
argued with Quine, that meaning from rule-following is holistic because the speaker knows how to 
use the word "atomic" in a new sentence because he/she knows what it means in a sentence which 
has frequently been used and understood. But the second pathway to meaning is that which 
captures the activity of knowing what exactly terms refer to (for that speaker) when they use them 
at a particular time and therefore what the meaning of a specific proposition will be. This requires 
something like knowledge of the sense (what is understood in using a certain term) of the term. A 
sentence can, if we take into account sense being a salient aspect of meaning, allow individual 
sentences to have meaning. It is for this reason that it is linguistically plausible and completely 
reasonable to look at a statement on its own in order to determine whether it can, for instance, be 
analytically true. Let us stay with the well worn example of "A bachelor is an unmarried man". The 
usual demonstration of the analytic is that the meanings of "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are 
interchangeable because the predicate "unmarried man" does not contain any more information 
than the subject "bachelor" itself. Carnap describes analytical statements as those which will come 
out true under every state description. Leibnitz refers to true in all possible worlds. If we do 
manage to resist Quine's arguments for holism and accept that statements can have independent 
meaning and can make reference independently, there is no reason why this statement cannot be 
true in the necessary way it poses to be. 
This is how: Analyticity usually refers to a relationship between the predicate and the subject of the 
same proposition e.g. "A circle (subject) is round (predicate)". But let us grant Quine his insistence 
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that it still remains a synthetic proposition because words are true of extensions, not each other. In 
Quine's view we would have to look for circles and roundness, because we cannot take for granted 
by virtue of meaning things such as circles and properties of roundness and see if they are the same 
things under all circumstances. This we do in order to establish what he calls "cognitive 
synonymy"- knowledge of each term having the same extension (1953; 28). Quite clearly, seen like 
this, it would be impossible to claim any sort of necessary truth because all reasoning must be, 
according to Quine, inductive. But this is not the right way to see it because one would not look, by 
empirical method, for a property such as roundness without simultaneously looking for a thing 
such as a circle. We know ourselves to be looking for the same thing. And if it transpires that we 
are mistaken to be assuming this (simultaneously looking for roundness when we look for circles) 
then it does not bode well for Quine's empiricism either. This is because empirical science is 
founded on the notion of classification- which is simply the artificial naming and categorizing of 
objects and properties. This means that according to our classification system for geometric objects 
and shapes, circles and roundness is the same thing. If we should find this not to be the case it 
would undoubtedly call for a revision of the names and categories because the object (which used 
to be a "circle") would still have the property (which used be to "round"). The whole thing is that 
they are, indefeasibly, extensionally synonymous irrespective of what we call them. But we have 
called them what we have because of what we have observed regarding their extensions. In other 
words, it is possibly so that analytical truths are founded on synthetic ones because we need to 
know, via the senses, what a circle is and round is to know that these mean the same thing. But 
once the speaker is warranted, because of being able to manifest the knowledge they have about the 
extensions of these terms, in using a term such as "circle" and round" in a sentence such as "A 
circle is round" it should be assumed that there will be no conditions under which that speaker 
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would make such a statement wherein the statement can be shown to be false. This is a necessary 
truth. If meaning is determined by verification conditions (knowing extension) Quine should have 
no problem with the analyticity of meaning. 
3. The a priori as knowledge derived from meaning alone. 
It could be argued that the a priori and analytic are related to each other in many possible ways. 
Traditionally, it is assumed that we can know the truth of analytical propositions but it would seem 
wrong, under present circumstances of having to explain the meaning of a principle, not to entertain 
the possibility of this not being correct. It may, for instance, be argued that it is possible to have 
analytical meaning but not analytical truths (because we cannot have a priori knowledge) or may be 
said that it cannot be right that analytical truths, or meaning, precede a priori knowledge but that 
the relationship is, in fact, the reverse of this. 
Paul Horwich argues in "Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority" (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; p 
150), that some of our justified beliefs are a priori but that a priori knowledge is never derived from 
our grasp of words or concepts. If this is true then Horwich will have to make some sort of 
argument explaining what sort of a priori beliefs are justified, but are not derived from grasping 
meaning. He explains that if knowledge is to be derived from meaning it would mean that it is by 
stipulation alone which we claim to derive truth about statements. So, Horwich describes implicit 
meaning as that sort of meaning which is attributed to a term in order to make the proposition to 
which it belongs true. This, he says (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; p 151), is not defensible 
because: 1. It seems impossible to establish which sentence will determine the use of the term and 
therefore its definition, 2. When something is merely stipulated to be true can we say that we have 
gained real knowledge and 3. Does our entitlement to say what we mean by a word really provide 
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an epistemic reason for commitment to those sentences which permit that meaning of the term? The 
long and short of this is that Horwich, rightly so, is questioning the claim that we can know 
anything from definition alone if attributing meaning, before we have knowledge, is such a dubious 
affair. If there are no criteria in place for guiding our stipulations of meaning then how are we to 
know that we have attributed the right sort of meaning at all. And if there is such uncertainty at the 
foundations of the notion of implicit meaning then how can we say that we can infer any sort of 
knowledge from meaning alone. Based on the preceding reasons Horwich concludes that we, in 
fact, show commitment to particular sentences not because these allow for certain terms to have the 
meanings that we want them to but rather because we are already committed to the existentially 
predicated expressions, and metaphysical claims, that such sentences are making (Hale & Wright: 
1997; p 157). So, if sentences have two components to them, a substance component, referring to 
the empirical content of the proposition, and a meaning component then substance, and therefore 
knowledge, must precede meaning (definition). This seems fair enough, particularly for 
verificationist theorist about meaning. 
But a problem which, quite evidently, does arise for Horwich, entails his blind spot about what sort 
of knowledge is in demand here. If he wants to hold that we have metaphysical commitments, 
based on certain knowledge, before we have meaning, then he must surely be referring to a 
posteriori knowledge. We know, however, that his intention is to be speaking about the relationship 
between the a priori and implicit definition. So, if it is a priori knowledge he requires before the 
attribution of meaning to particular terms, then what is it that he first wants to know? If it is the 
referents of the terms then this kind of knowledge will be of the a posteriori kind because it will 
require knowledge of the world. We must grant that Horwich refers intentionally to a priori 
knowledge preceding meaning but it then remains a mystery what, besides entities of the world and 
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the meanings of terms, can be known. Of course, it is possible that Horwich does endorse some 
form of synthetic a priori knowledge and is, therefore, claiming that the prior metaphysical 
commitments are based on a priori knowledge and to this I respond by referring back to the 
aforementioned argument against the respectability of synthetic a priori knowledge. In other words, 
if we cannot, under any conditions, determine meaning before we have knowledge then what are 
the objects, in Horwich's case, that we can know when we are not expecting to gain empirical 
knowledge? 
Wright and Hale, in "Implicit Definition and the A Priori" (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; p 286), 
also raise some objections to Horwich's argument against implicit definition yielding knowledge. 
Their argument simply contests that attributing meaning needs to be a dubious affair. Their central 
claim is that implicit definition says how terms can be legitimately used within a particular context 
and in doing so determines the meaning of such terms. However, it is central to their argument to 
determine the conditions under which meanings can be constituted by implicit definition. The 
further claim is that this sort of definition can have a role to play in some forms of non-inferential a 
priori knowledge. 
Hale and Wright's primary worry with Horwich's argument is that it has misinterpreted what 
implicit definition is and has, based on this misinterpretation, attached unwarranted problems to the 
notion of implicit definition (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; p 290). If implicit definition is seen as 
something like fixing a reference or finding the correct preexisting definition of a definiendum 
(term), then the problems he has outlined seem plausible. However, since implicit definition is 
nothing like reference fixing and is certainly not some sort of innate definition of a term, 
understood in realist terms, which is invisible to us until knowledge of something has been 
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acquired, it cannot be said that we necessarily have the sort of problems with implicit definition 
that Horwich claims we do (Boghossian & Peacocke; pp 291). Added to this, according to Hale and 
Wright, if Horwich wants knowledge to precede meaning he would then be referring to explicit 
definition. (Which is the aspect of meaning that is determined by verification conditions.) 
So, what exactly do Hale and Wright refer to when they defend the possibility of implicit definition 
yielding a priori knowledge? Because this seems a very odd sequence- definition preceding 
knowledge- for theorists who tend to endorse Verificationism. They, firstly, specify (Boghossian & 
Peacocke: 2000; pp 296) that a priori knowledge must meet two conditions: 1. the meaning of the 
sentence must be determined by implicit definition and 2. the meaning of the sentence must be 
determined by that alone and must require no further epistemic support (such as empirical proof). 
Clearly, this sort of limiting of the a priori implies that there is a positive link between meaning and 
the a priori, to the extent that meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition for the a priori. In 
tying things up this tightly it becomes apparent that only a certain type of sentence will meet these 
conditions and that the scope of this sort of truth by definition is very limited- but certainly not 
impossible. These conditions basically ask that the sentence can be true without any other epistemic 
support. This is, of course, not an un-contentious demand as there is much dispute about what can 
be true with or without additional epistemic support (reminiscent of Quine's arguments). 
Furthermore, sentences must also be consistent with other linguistic "objects" within an established 
discourse, in order to determine a coherent use for the terms in question and to yield non-inferential 
a priori knowledge. In other words, it must be explicitly and observably adhering to the rules of a 
particular language. So, a good implicit definition will allow comprehension of any sentence 
wherein the definiendum is used. Also, the inference rules, applied within the sentence itself must 
be in harmony. This means that the logical connectives such as "therefore", "hence", "and", "or" 
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and so on must allow the sentence, employing the particular definition for a term, to make logical 
sense. In short, the sentence must be logically valid and epistemologically satisfied, and this 
without the need for further epistemological justification of any kind. If we look carefully at the 
picture being painted here we have sentences which can be true by definition alone- which seems 
very much like what we take analytical truth to be. The point is then, for our purposes, whether or 
not the sentence which articulates the Verification Principle could be a sentence which Hale and 
Wright regard as legitimately capable of implicit definition. 
The real worry then is not only with whether the criteria, posed by Hale and Wright, are the right 
ones, but whether there are any sentences which can actually meet these criteria. Wright and Hale 
do not make specific reference to examples of such sentences but do mention that implicit meaning 
is good for mathematics and logic. One of the most important qualities of such sentences is that 
they will be extremely conservative in regards to forwarding information. This we know is true of, 
for instance, deductive arguments as opposed to inductive ones, so it seems entirely plausible that 
the class of sentences which will permit knowledge based purely on definition and rule following 
will not be saying anything very much about the world, hence Hale and Wright's insistence that 
this type of a priori knowledge must be non-inferential. In other words, we should not be tempted 
to draw conclusions of the broadly informative kind from implicitly defined sentences. And it 
seems entirely right that the sort of knowledge that only such a sentence will produce will be of the 
a priori kind. 
One of the primary reasons why Hale and Wright want to endorse an approach to implicit meaning, 
is to allow scientific theories a role in determining the meaning of their own vocabularies, without 
the compromise of their empirical information (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; pp 306-307). The 
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immediate worry that should come to mind is that it seems impossible for scientific theories to meet 
the condition of conservativeness because it is captured, by the very nature of science, to postulate 
empirical truths, which are just too broad to be conservative in the way implicitly defined sentences 
are. Added to this a scientific theory cannot assume the very things it wants to prove. So how is it 
to stipulate the meaning of its terms before it has been tested for its truth or before it has appealed 
to knowledge or verification? Also, we know that scientific theories must be testable and 
falsifiable, and are therefore in need of additional epistemic support, but implicit meaning is 
certainly not the type of meaning which is experientially defeasible. We seem, at first glance, to 
have a situation of stale mate. Scientific theories need what implicit definition can do for them, yet 
have all the qualities of propositions which could never be implicitly defined and, hence, be true by 
virtue of their meaning alone. But if Hale and Wright's suggestion is going to work for scientific 
principles then what is to say that it will work for a principle of meaning? In other words, what 
makes the Verification Principle similar to scientific theories or principles? The Verification 
Principle also makes a suggestion, based on the intrinsic normative nature that principles have, 
which is not self-evidently true and therefore needs further epistemic support in order to determine 
its truth. But, like scientific theories, it must be possible for the sentence which articulates the 
theory or principle to have meaning and yield some sort of understanding before it is tested 
(verified) in the way necessary for settling its truth. 
The solution, according to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, is that theories such as these should be 
expressed in a conditional form in order to have implicit meaning and to be knowable a priori 
(Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; p 308). The way to do this is to understand the theoretical 
proposition in two ways and to cater for the two needs entirely separately. Firstly, the theory needs 
to be expressed in such a way as to allow it to assert particular and recognisable empirical content 
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without the deployment of an unusual theoretical vocabulary. It can achieve this aim by using the 
form of an existential generalization. However, clearly, if the theory were left as this type of 
assertion it would be in need of additional epistemic support and could not be true by virtue of its 
meaning alone. It seems to be necessary to, somehow, fix the theoretical terms which are used with 
the intention of being introduced and this is achieved, secondly, by expressing the theory as a 
conditional sentence. 
Before we continue; it could be argued, against this solution for showing how empirical terms can 
have implicit meaning, that introducing a conditional structure is just side-stepping the fundamental 
need of empirical terms to have epistemological support. This is an objection which should be 
addressed. It must be remembered that introducing the conditional is not the same as claiming the 
truth of the theory itself. It is not pretending to substitute the proper testing which theories need to 
undergo in order to be shown to be true. If the meaning of empirical theories are to be subject to 
their falsifiability then we would never, in the light of the revisability of contingent knowledge, be 
able to attribute any sort of certain meaning to such theories. But a fear of this possibility, that 
empirical theories can have no settled meanings, should not deter us from accepting the truth of this 
state of affairs. However, it does seem to be possible to confer a use-orientated model for the 
understanding of theoretical terms, as long as the proposition, in order to have meaning, is not 
making any sort of claims that are in need of additional epistemic assistance. In using conditional 
sentences it is being proposed that terms can only have a use under particular conditions. So, 
conditional sentences make explicit the context in which the terms must have that use. 
What we can take from this last section is that it is possible to have a priori knowledge but only if it 
is founded in implicit definition. And this is only legitimate under very specific conditions, which 
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makes the group of sentences which can yield a priori knowledge a rather small and very specific 
group. The question with which to continue then is whether or not implicit definition can save the 
principle from itself- in other words can implicit definition, while constrained in the way Hale and 
Wright propose, serve as some sort of verification conditions? 
Section 3: How best to understand the Verification Principle 
Being in any manner convinced by Hale and Wright's, as opposed to Paul Horwich's, arguments in 
section 2 does not necessarily translate into the meaning of the principle being able to be rescued in 
this manner. It still needs to be argued that the criteria for meaning imposed by a principle stating 
that meaning is determined by verification conditions have been met by the principle itself. And, if 
it is the suggestion that Hale and Wright's implicit definition argument is right, it must still be 
shown to be right in a very particular way. We shall, therefore, in this third section of the first 
chapter, determine whether the principle is capable of implicit definition and is, therefore, able to 
be meaningful in this way. This possibility will be assessed in terms of the previous discussion on 
the a priori and what has and has not been endorsed within this argument already. Thus, no 
investigation of the Verification Principle, as having, for instance, synthetic a priori meaning, will 
be entertained, as the synthetic a priori has already been disqualified as a legitimate category of 
knowledge and therefore a foundation for meaning. 
The Verification Principle as implicitly defined 
Of course, the preferred choice for the meaning of the Verification Principle ought to be that it 
should have either of the two types of meanings which it explicitly regards as literal. If this can be 
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shown to be the case it would not just be capable of some sort of meaning, such as in the case of 
metaphorical meaning or normative a priori meaning, but the only type of meaning that can save it 
from itself. Literal empirical meaning has been ruled out based on the fact that the referents of the 
terms employed by this proposition cannot be known a posteriori and we are therefore not dealing 
with an empirical claim. The remaining possibility is the analytic. If the principle is ever to be 
verified the nature of the conditions for verification would be of the analytic kind. The question 
here is what, exactly, are the conditions which the principle must meet which will permit its 
meaning being derived by definition alone? 
We have looked at an argument made by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale for the possibility of 
implicit definition attributing meaning and yielding a priori knowledge. The importance of this 
claim, for the present purposes, is not that we can derive knowledge from implicit definition, but 
rather that implicit definition can result in the attribution of meaning for certain propositions. Hale 
and Wright state what the conditions are under which implicit definition can do this, and it is now 
our task to see whether the articulation of Verification Principle can adhere to these conditions. 
Before we continue with our investigation of the proposed implicit meaning of the principle it 
should be reiterated that the conditions for sentences permitting a priori knowledge is that they are 
implicitly defined and that they are only defined in this way and are not in need of any other sort of 
epistemic support. So, if it is found that the principle can be defined in this way it may be that this 
has gone some way towards showing that it can yield knowledge in the area it proposes to. And this 
is the task of the rest of this thesis. 
Now, Hale and Wright state that implicit meaning should not be confused with some sort of 
reference fixing. It is herein exactly that their objection to Horwich lies, as he proposes that we 
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need knowledge of the objects in question before we can establish the definitions of the referring 
terms. But, say Hale and Wright, this sequence would not be giving us implicit definition but 
explicit definition. They then identify the problem that arises for theories, and in particular 
scientific theories. The dilemma has already been outlined so a repeat is unneccessary. Let it suffice 
to say that theories, and principles, need some way of being meaningful without begging the 
question by employing the very terms which need testing and other types of epistemic support. The 
Verification Principle, it seems to me, is in the same sort of predicament. Hale and Wright's 
solution of articulating the theory as a related proposition, using an existential generalisation within 
a conditional sentence, will allow the theory to be implicitly defined without compromising its 
empirical content. The verification conditions which are so needed in order to determine the 
meaning of the principle will be whether or not the conditional relation holds. This is so because it 
is whether or not the conditional relation holds which will render the statement (in this case the 
Verification Principle) either true or false. 
By using conditional sentences we enable the fixing of the theoretical terms we wish to use but 
only in a particular context. So, we are not proposing to fix references in any sort of absolute way. 
Verification Principle: "Meaning is determined by verification conditions." 
Existential generalisation: Language is assertoric. 
Conditional: If language is assertoric then meaning is determined by verification conditions. 
The Verification Principle serves the verification thesis as a scientific theory serves a scientific 
investigation. Principles, in this sense, are subject to the same dilemma as scientific theories. They 
are in need of legitimately being able to determine the meanings of the terms which they employ 
without assuming their content which must remain revisable. It is for this reason that the "vehicle 
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of implicit definition" (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; pp 308) is regarded to not to be the theory 
itself, but "some other sentence so related to the theory that its stipulation or acceptance as true on 
the one hand suffices to confer meaning on the other...." (Boghossian & Peacocke: 2000; pp 308). 
Conditional sentences obtain meaning from the specific relation in which terms, used in such 
sentences, stand to each other. It is my suggestion that the Verification Principle be rephrased: 
When language is assertoric meaning is determined by verification conditions. 
So phrased, the Verification Principle, becomes implicitly defined. It proposes that //language is to 
be regarded as "representational" (when articulated as an assertion) then the terms "meaning" and 
"verification conditions" stand in a specific relation to each other. Meaning is seen as determined 
by verification conditions. The meaning which has been conferred on the latter proposition has 
been enabled by the specification of the context which is articulated by the antecedent (assertoric 
nature of language- "if) in which these terms are to have this particular kind of use by standing in 
this relation to each other. In other words, a reference fixing has been made possible but not in the 
problematic sense to which Horwich objects (that is in a way in which the fixing is forwarded as 
necessary but the use of the language requires it to be revisable). A random stipulation based on 
what would make the proposition true is not what has happened by articulating the principle as a 
conditional sentence. The terms have been given literal meaning but only in as much as the 
conditional claim is proven to hold. So, in a sense, it has provisional meaning. 
And thus we end this chapter's attempt to resist the classical objection to the Verification Principle. 
It has been argued that, firstly, the principle is in no different a position to any other scientific, 
linguistic or any other sort of principle. Principles have implicit normativity as they propose how 
matters should be understood or tested or predicted. But most theorists regard principles as 
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revisable as the truth of these principles is dependent on whether or not the understanding, testing 
and predicting which they propose is correct. In this sense it is going to be the proof of the principle 
which will absolutely settle the meaning of it. Testing the conditional is verifying the principle. 
And this is not a simple matter to settle and will be the task of the rest of this thesis. But this proof 
will yield explicit meaning, as Hale and Wright say. In the meantime we must settle for a sort of 
implicit definition of the terms employed- this implicit definition being the result of an a priori 
understanding of what it means when concepts stand in a conditional relation to each other. 
It is entirely conceded that the truth of the Verification Principle, even stated as a conditional 
sentence, is not as self-evident as "all bachelors are unmarried men" or "12 - 7= 5". And these are 
after all the only sort of sentences, according to Hale and Wright, which are apt for implicit 
definition. But not all, for instance, mathematical sentences are self-evidently true either. Some are 
so complex in their expressions that they need proofs to support their truth. However, if it transpires 
that they are, indeed, true, there are not many theorists who would deny that they are analytically 
true. The thesis to follow will serve as such a proof for a sentence which I hope will be seen, in the 
end, to be analytically true. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Some foundational principles: What principles need to be presupposed by a verificationist 
theory of meaning? 
At times it is necessary to offer some sort of justification for adopting a particular system or 
strategy for doing a philosophical investigation. The reason seems apparent; often the outcomes of 
a philosophical analysis will be criticized for its method and this, in itself, will be regarded as the 
reason for why certain controversial or even just plain seemingly incorrect conclusions have been 
drawn. Since the aim usually is to convince the reader of a particular conclusion (that this 
conclusion does follow logically and necessarily from the premises given), and seeing as this task 
alone poses enough challenges, it seems that the rejection of an overall method is an unnecessary 
variable which is best eliminated at the outset of the argument. Chapter 2 has two tasks: the one is 
to explain the close association between analytical philosophy and verificationist theory. The 
reason why this is useful is that it seems to be a first line of defense for the Verification principle 
which has often stood under fire within the analytical tradition. It is my contention that this is due 
to some misunderstandings about what the principle states. It will be argued that when we start an 
investigation about the meaning of something like moral language it seems most natural to look, 
firstly, at how we use moral language, and then, based on this understanding of "use" to 
demonstrate why a verificationist theory of meaning is the correct theory to adopt in the analysis of 
moral language. This chapter sees in part a historical look at the connection between 
verificationism and analytical philosophy and then also a detailed defense of why sense should be 
regarded a salient aspect of meaning. The claim about sense being important for meaning is 
relevant for the development of the rest of the argument in the following chapters because sense is 
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seen as closer to verification conditions than for instance referencing alone. Simply, the reason for 
this is that sense has to do with speaker knowledge and intention of the terms and propositions 
employed. 
Analytical philosophy can be safely characterised as a general change in philosophical method. 
This change is possibly best described as a move away from a philosophy which is characterised by 
unqualified profundity and semantic vagueness. Analytic philosophy, in one sense, can be 
described as an attempt to theorise and argue from a position which is free from unqualified 
metaphysical and meta-ethical commitments and aims to conclude only what can be done with 
complete rationality and unquestionable proof. The outcome is something which only allows for the 
most conservative of steps to be taken making the first prize that of achieving clarity in expression 
and the logical deduction of inferences which can also, conclusively, be proven to be true. It is easy 
to see, therefore, that skepticism of the method which analytical philosophy advocates will result in 
skepticism towards the conclusions drawn about the myriad of arguments (such as metaphysical 
and meta-ethical arguments) located within this tradition. I, of course, am well aware that analytic 
philosophy is hardly in need of a defense anymore, but it does seem that when an attempt is made 
to defend a verificationist theory about meaning, and in anticipation of the usual objections to such 
an argument, it becomes particularly necessary to revisit the reasons for a linguistic turn in 
philosophy. 
It is because verificationism and linguistic philosophy share a common base that this section 
consists of an attempt to explain why it is right to say that semantic theories (realism or anti-realism 
about meaning) must provide, and therefore precede, a basis for metaphysical (or ethical) disputes 
in philosophy. This is relevant because much of what is central to an investigation into the 
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meaningfulness of moral language hinges on conclusions drawn about the realism/ anti-realism 
dispute. It would entail an assumption of grave proportions to just set forth with an argument about 
realism and anti-realism in language, and which describes moral language best, before a 
justification has been offered for the overall method being employed. 
What follows has, to quite a large degree, been based on some readings of Michael Dummett's 
work and some very good, and exceptionally helpful secondary writings by philosophers who have 
looked extensively at his work. Having said this it would be wrong to give the impression that the 
next section is posing to be another analysis of Dummett's work. I have not, by any means, done an 
extensive investigation of his work and it should not be assumed, unless it is directly stated to be 
the case, that the content reflects, attempts to reflect or endorses specific views of his. It is, 
however, impossible to propose a verificationist theory about meaning without paying credence to 
Dummett's work. 
It is also impossible, and unnecessary, for this thesis to address all the challenges which face 
verificationism (or its associate: anti-realism) about things like the past and mathematics and so on. 
I shall keep my attention directed at the challenges which pose problems for verificationist theories 
about the meaning of moral language. It is my wish that the reader is aware of the fact that I have 
not worked under the illusion that this thesis makes bold claims about having solved some of the 
intricate and technical problems which have been borne from this particular discourse. It has, 
however, made every attempt, as is its task, to observe the most obvious and damaging problems 
for a verificationist theory about meaning. 
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Bold claims have been made about verificationist theories about meaning and linguistic philosophy 
sharing a common foundation- now let us see if this is the case and why this is significant for an 
argument about moral language. 
Section 1: The motivation for philosophy of language 
Anyone who has made a study of the history of western philosophy will most likely agree that it is 
characterised by a tradition of trying to solve problems of existence, causality, matter, properties 
(such as moral properties) and so on by way of presenting rational proofs. Rational proofs are 
arguments which are based on laws of inference, in other words logical laws, and a good proof is 
generally regarded as one which manifests legitimate entailment from plausible premises. We have 
all learnt about deductive and inductive reasoning and contingent and necessary truths. We have 
learnt about a priori and a posteriori knowledge. And all these components of reasoning, it is said, 
are factored into deciding which proofs offer the best explanations for things like certain 
phenomena or moral attitudes. In short, it is probably fair to say that these components of reasoning 
have been the tools of philosophical deliberation and the argument or proof which displays the best 
use of these gets to be the best explanation for the issue under dispute. 
And, predominantly, it is thought that these are indeed the only sorts of tools available to 
philosophers. Philosophy is not a discipline characterised by field work or empirical research. It 
does its work conceptually and analytically. But philosophy does aim to, and certainly claims to, 
forward some truths about reality. The fact that this is its primary activity and it does so with full 
awareness of what tools it has at its disposal must mean that its labourers, the philosophers, believe 
this task to be possible using only the aforementioned conceptual tools. Hence all the arguments 
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ranging from Plato's argument for how we can have knowledge for things such as Forms (those 
mysterious things which are the stable essences of the volatile and unreliable material world) to 
Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God, to error theorists' proofs for the absence of 
things such as moral properties. But each new theory can and has been outplayed by a new and 
better theory. The concerns which motivated the verificationist theories of the logical positivists 
was this apparent inability of philosophy to settle any of the most pervasive and fundamental 
disputes therein, as well as the tendency of philosophical language to become progressively more 
obscure and unwarranted in making its various claims to truth. The positivists were intent on 
cleaning up philosophy and proposed that if the traditional problems were approached, not from 
within meta-ethical, political or metaphysical deliberation, as has been the tradition, but rather with 
a focus on the language which we employ to describe and then solve the problems, a real clarity 
can be achieved. This linguistic turn saw the birth of analytical philosophy. 
Dummett's verificationist theory about meaning, and his endorsement of this order of philosophical 
deliberation, is motivated by exactly the same concerns. But save the brief sketch offered above, no 
more needs to be said about the historical background to the Dummettian notion of solving 
metaphysical disputes via theories about meaning. The purpose, however, of including a brief 
historical sketch of the linguistic turn in philosophy is to prepare the reader for the fact that 
analytical philosophy's project to solve various disputes within philosophy by looking at language 
may be part of one of the most important premises for endorsing a verificationist linguistic theory. 
In other words, the assumption is that any analytic philosopher should already be committed to this 
order of theorising (as it is this order which defines analytical philosophy) and the intent is to show 
that once this commitment has been made it should not be hard to see why our language [use] 
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predisposes us, as theorists, to verificationist theories about meaning. It is for this reason that the 
motivations for analytical philosophy are part of a defence for verificationism. 
The effort being made to show the historical connections between analytic philosophy and the 
Verification Principle is aimed at sensitizing the critic of Verificationism- particularly those critics 
who see themselves working within the analytical tradition. But, naturally, the success of this effort 
to create awareness cannot alone stand as a defense for the principle. It can at most raise a "guard" 
for Verificationism. But it certainly is not the claim that this alone is a foolproof guard or 
impenetrable argument. 
The first point in need of clarification regarding the application of the principle is the one about 
"meaninglessness" in the positivist sense. Even though much of the talk about meaning emerges 
from the positivists and, in particular, their verification principle, not all theories about meaning 
which are based in verificationist notions will deem most of what philosophy does and what 
language users do as meaningless or dismiss the traditional questions as pseudo ones. As Dummett 
says (1991; 10) of the positivists: "The doctrine was meant to be liberating; but it failed to exorcise 
the psychological allure exerted by the metaphysical pictures." We just cannot seem to stop 
speaking about reality, or what we hope or think is reality, despite the fact that we cannot always do 
this in a rational and appropriately conservative manner. Our propositions about the world (and 
morality) have meaning to us regardless of how certain we can be of their truth. Contemporary 
verificationist theories about meaning acknowledge this fact about how we communicate, but place 
constraints on the legitimacy of our propositions (in terms of their factualist nature). 
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It would be a mistake, at any future point of reading this thesis, to think that the claim is that our 
moral language, for instance, is meaningless. I have hoped, in briefly speaking in this manner about 
"meaninglessness", to have eliminated such a worry. The Verification Principle is merely 
concerned with the legitimacy of factual language because factual language masquerades as more 
than just subjective expressions of a kind- it claims to be denoting objective states of affairs which 
seems, to me, to be begging for greater criteria for legitimacy. And it is this legitimacy with which 
our work ahead concerns itself. 
Section 2: Sense determines reference 
This section presents an argument for why reference and sense should be regarded ingredients of 
meaning. The rest of this thesis relies quite heavily on a clear understanding of these two terms 
(sense and reference) and in what way I see them serving a meaning theory. It is of particular 
importance to understand the sense of a term or proposition as being closer (than the reference) to 
the verification conditions of that term or proposition. 
In order to really get to grips with what the differences between various meaning theories are it is 
necessary to understand the dispute around sense (what we understand in using a term) and 
reference (denoting of an object or property). The reason for this is that a theory about how we 
derive meaning is going to have to settle some important issues around the exact relationship 
between sense and reference. In other words, if a meaning theory proposes that we (and with this 
"we" I mean language users) obtain meaning by making the correct reference to objects there will 
be no need to include knowledge of sense in such a definition of meaning. Let me caution, from the 
outset, that it is tempting to say about theories about meaning, that terms and propositions must be 
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implicitly defined in some way in order for us to even make reference at all. In other words, it is 
said, that meaning must precede reference. To some extent this is true, of course. For instance, in 
order to establish what a proposition's verification or truth conditions are we must first have access 
to its meaning. But this claim is missing the point to quite a large degree. When theorists speculate 
about meaning they are attempting to address the questions around legitimate language use. So 
philosophers are not so much concerned with the fact that speakers all may have some 
understanding of a word, sometimes even words speakers think they recognise in other languages, 
as with what meaning can legitimately be attributed to a term and proposition based on the 
understanding of a whole lot of issues which impact on the meaning making process. Unlike using 
correct referencing (denoting of an object or property) alone as a way by which speakers derive 
meaning, a theory of meaning which is more inclined to include a full blooded understanding of the 
content of a term will want to say that the sense of that term needs to be an aspect of determining 
its meaning. In other words, a sense based theory will hold that we cannot make proper reference 
without substantive knowledge of the content of our understanding (the sense) of a term or 
statement. 
What exactly is sense then to give it such importance for a verificationist theory about meaning? 
The sense of a term is, according to Dummett, "to know everything relevant to determining its 
semantic value that needs to be known about it by anyone who knows the language." (1991; 123) (I 
have underlined for greater emphasis.) This, at the very least, means that the sense of a term is 
related to knowledge about that term. Admittedly, the quoted definition above is more specific than 
my stipulation of it, in that it suggests exactly what type of, or how much, knowledge is required to 
know the sense of a term. But, for present purposes let us remain with my stipulation because 
Dummett's definition could, at this stage of an argument about whether sense determines reference 
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be accused of question begging. We first need to demonstrate why [knowledge of] sense should be 
an aspect of meaning. The reason for Dummett's definition is based on his insistence that sense 
does, in fact, determine reference. But this is something which still asks for an independent 
argument here. To the extent of which I am aware it is impossible to mention one theorist or a 
particular philosophical position which overtly advocates that reference alone determines meaning. 
The point is merely that if sense is taken as seriously as it ought to be, regarding its role in 
meaning, those theorists would all be verificationists. If theorists about meaning are not 
verificationists, they cannot be giving proper credence to sense. In what follows I hope to test any 
theorist's seeming commitment to sense as an aspect of meaning. 
So let us take the sense of a term to be knowledge of the understanding of the object or property (in 
other words the content) which the word denotes. This knowledge is more than just the sort of 
knowledge which is needed to point to an object and successfully say that (object X) is a heffalump 
but having no intimate sort of knowledge, the sort of knowledge which is characterised by direct 
access to the state of affairs being understood and denoted, of what a heffalump is. Presumably we 
learn to point to objects and name them by being taught the names of things (which we can 
recognise) and this ability to point to an object and correctly employ a term to denote it is making 
"reference". Imagine teaching a chimpanzee to point to the numeral (3) when it is either verbally or 
in writing confronted with the word "three". This behaviour of the chimpanzee indicates the ability 
to reference and does not indicate that the chimpanzee has any real understanding of what "three" 
consists in. Compare this, for instance, to the chimpanzee being able to correctly point out an 
(orange) when confronted with the word "orange" if oranges are his favourite food and he knows 
what they taste like, smell like and that he can peel them and eat them. This intimate knowledge of 
the content of the word "orange" is what is meant by the sense of a word (or a whole statement). 
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And it is not possible to explain away the difference between the example of the chimp pointing to 
the (orange) and the numeral (3) as a simple misunderstanding that can be clarified on testing the 
chimps knowledge of the two objects to which it is making reference. It is precisely this testing, 
which may be proposed as explaining the appearance of a difference in the chimpanzee making 
reference to two objects (one which it knows well and the other not) which an appeal to verification 
conditions attempt to address. The argument is that the chimp has no sense of the numeral (3) and 
therefore has no understanding of what the word "three" means. It merely knows how to correctly 
make reference to (3). 
Verification conditions are closely related to sense because both sense and verification conditions 
appeal to knowledge of extension beyond just simple recognition of the objects or state of affairs in 
the world. 
My aim also, in making an appeal to something such as chimpanzee knowledge, is to draw to the 
reader's attention the fact that an intimate understanding of the content of language may be 
different for each individual agent. This is why a term can have only one correct reference but 
many senses. I can point to an object (3) and a chimpanzee can do the same and, even if we both do 
so correctly, we can probably still have very different ideas about that object. This must mean that 
when I make reference to (3) I shall have a different understanding of what (3) is compared to a 
chimpanzee which is pointing at it. These different understandings of terms are what is called the 
senses of a term and it is for this reason that one object in reality can have different senses even 
though it may only have one proper reference. But the acknowledgement of the fact that there are 
different senses to a term can pose a serious worry for arguments which do not have the capacity to 
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allow fully for how we determine the meanings of our terms. Arguments which start with 
metaphysical presuppositions, such as an argument for a moral fact being it is wrong to torture 
babies, need to assume we are all on the same page as to what is being made reference to (the 
existence of things such as moral facts) in order to enable the proofs to be successful. But the fact 
of the matter is that we, quite evidently, would be wrong to assume that we all mean the same 
thing, even when we do agree on the referencing, and that such assumptions are precisely the 
reason why an approach in philosophy starting with metaphysical claims (as opposed to starting 
with theories about meaning) has never been able to yield any real solutions to our philosophical 
problems. It could be objected that we may still all mean the same thing even though we have 
different ideas about that thing. My contention is that we cannot all be meaning the same thing if 
we have different ideas about it- even if we can all point to the same object. Meaning is more than 
identification. Meaning must be derived from an intimate knowledge of the thing being represented 
because if it is not the deductions we make in our reasoning about reality will be confounded, and 
either thought to be true when they're not or false when they're not (or one of these when it is 
neither). This is very apparent in a statement like: "God is a merciful God". This statement can only 
be true in some senses of the word "God" even if everyone understands what is being referred to 
when using the word "God". But more importantly, it can only be true if certain conditions obtain 
and we can only claim this to be true if we have access to those conditions. And none of the above 
conditions can be satisfied by referencing and rational proofs alone. 
The intention is to show that when sense is seriously taken to be an ingredient of meaning, that this 
entails a natural commitment to the notion that rational proofs cannot, alone and unsupported by 
further epistemic conditions, solve metaphysical problems. This is because the sense of a term 
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requires knowledge of the states of affairs which are being understood in using such a term. The 
relevance for moral language is that, if sense is a salient ingredient of meaning, we need to be able 
to give an account of what exactly it is we understand when we say things like "It is wrong to break 
promises". 
The debate between whether the solutions to philosophical problems should proceed starting from 
metaphysical theorising or from theorising about meaning is tied in with whether or not sense does, 
or ought to, determine reference. (Of course, I am aligned with Dummett on this in that theories 
about meaning should make explicit that sense should determine reference but the intention is to 
force an acknowledgement that this is not always taken into account in meaning theories, e.g. 
proofs for the existence of moral facts.) The connection runs like this: in the preceding explanation 
it was forwarded that philosophy, prior to the onset of analytical philosophy, attempted to solve 
philosophical disputes, such as whether or not moral properties are mind independent or not, by 
rational proofs. What this asks for is that the rules of inferential reasoning are obeyed and that the 
conclusions, therefore, follow validly from the premises. In order to achieve a reasonable amount 
of success employing such a strategy, all that we need from our use of language (our terms and 
propositions) is that we reference properly. This can be done without an intimate knowledge of the 
understanding of the terms and statements. It is merely necessary to know, in principle, that "God" 
refers to the (object God) and in knowing this the argument can proceed happily, making possible 
the a priori knowledge so highly prized in philosophy. So, holding the position that either sense 
does not determine reference, or that there is no distinction between sense and reference, means 
that, provided inferential rules are followed, we are entitled to deduce truths about the real world by 
employing the means of proper referencing and valid reasoning. It may be denied that any self-
respecting philosopher would ever think themselves capable of deducing truths about the real world 
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while merely remaining faithful to correct referencing and inferential rule following. My claim is 
that this is exactly what theorists do when they make arguments for the existence of things like 
moral facts. Facts which have the property of containing some sort of moral value need to be 
proven by further means. And there just are no such other means available- at present. Propositions 
which make claims to the existence of moral facts or depend on the truth of such claims for their 
own truth are, after all, existential propositions. And it should be quite evident, after so many years 
of doing analytical philosophy, that these sorts of claims remain largely unsubstantiated when the 
only proof provided is that of a rational kind. This way of doing philosophy enables an approach 
characterised by metaphysical theories infirming meaning theories. This is because the primary 
concern is not with what we know about the object (or property) being referred to but rather with 
what conclusions we can validly draw while making reference. I propose that if, however, meaning 
theories were informing metaphysical ones the very difficulty with the meaning of moral 
propositions would disallow further speculations of the metaphysical kind. The objection to 
metaphysical theories informing meaning theories must be that it is highly questionable whether 
valid proofs, secured by proper but, what amounts to, vacuous referencing is, in fact, enough to 
legitimise statements about the real world and existence. Surely, this is in breach of the agreement 
about the fundamental distinction between validity and soundness. And if soundness (factual truth) 
is what we're after we need to be able to give support for the plausibility of our premises and this, it 
seems to me, just cannot be done by referencing alone. All we can derive from rule following and 
referencing (if undetermined by sense) is validity- never truth of the substantive kind. And this will 
have consequences for meaning. 
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Taking then that there is a distinction between sense and reference let us look at how this 
distinction (referencing being the ability to identify the state of affairs and sense being the 
understanding a particular speaker has of a particular term- this being derived from experience with 
that state of affairs) impacts on philosophy which works via theories about meaning to theories 
about metaphysics and other things. According to the linguistic philosophical method (meaning 
theories to metaphysical theories) we start our investigations by looking at how we use our 
language. In other words, we start with describing our linguistic practice and setting norms in place 
to ensure that our practice can meet our criteria for legitimate language use. The reason why this 
approach is thought to be more fruitful is that it is thought that much of our disputes are due to a 
lack of clarity and agreement about the meanings of the terms we use. So our tendency to make 
reference to, for instance, the objective, mind-independent existence of moral value needs 
explaining and justification. 
What we have thus far is an argument for sense being regarded an important aspect of meaning for 
any valid theory about meaning. The reason being offered is related to the way in which speakers 
use language. The notion of sense, understood as a specific type of speaker knowledge, must form 
part of determining whether or not the speaker has used a particular term or proposition correctly 
(legitimately). 
But what does our tendency towards using language in a realist (objective, mind independent) way 
mean for the preceding discussion about sense and reference? With realist language I specifically 
mean statements and terms that are structured or used in a way that their syntactical composition or 
contribution lends them the force of an indicative statement. Bernhard Weiss, in Michael Dummett 
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(2002; 17), speaks of assertions as sentences which are used in an indicative way, in other words, as 
sentences posing to state some sort of truth. Let it be said, before the conversation is biased in any 
way that will prevent it from being useful for our ends, that, unfortunately, for the realist 
philosopher the pervasive use of realist language cannot be taken as any sort of vindication of 
realist theory because the question here is precisely about clarification of language use. In other 
words, the idea is to determine when our language use is legitimate. But, it is certainly true that our 
tendency to use language indicatively does give an indication to our psychological commitments to 
our propositions and the facts which we believe them to be tracking. We shall need to, and 
therefore will, give a significant amount of attention to language competency in the text that 
follows, but for now it is merely important to look at how the relationship between sense and 
reference stands for philosophy which works from the bottom up. 
If our realist language does show something about what we expect from our language it would 
seem a mistake to overlook this expectation as an ingredient in the way in which we derive 
meaning. Since realist language makes reference to objects in and properties of the world as if they 
exist independently of our minds, and that the tracking of these facts depends on the ability of the 
speaker, it must be assumed, if it is being claimed that this is true, that the speaker has successfully 
done so in order to speak in the way that they are. The question then is what requirements has the 
speaker, employing such factualist language, met in order to justify the bandying about of such 
claims to truth? The use of assertion shows that we expect evidence in support of our claims. We 
expect that there exists evidence somewhere whether we have access to it or not. But the astute 
reader should note that there is quite a leap from saying that we expect to have evidence in support 
of claims and that we expect that there is evidence in support of our claims- despite the fact that we 
may not know what this evidence is or where to find it. 
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If the sense of a term is a more intimate knowledge of what is understood about the content of that 
term or state of affairs that a proposition denotes then, sense forms part of what we mean when we 
use such terms and propositions. The sense should surely be regarded as part of the reality which 
the speaker is claiming to track in using language indicatively. In this way it seems quite natural to 
think of sense as an element of meaning. The controversy, however, is seated in the fact that some 
theorists maintain that if we cannot show that we have knowledge of the sense of a term we ought 
not to be making any sort of reference. Dummett puts it like this: "But meaning, of which sense is 
the salient ingredient, is entirely correlative to understanding: to ask after the meaning of an 
expression is to ask what has to be grasped in order to understand it." (1991) If this claim is true it 
will be true by virtue of how we do, in fact, use language. So Dummett is not posing an ideal here, 
he is merely describing what it is we understand ourselves to be doing when we make assertions. 
He is not posing an ideal because he is not being prescriptive about language use, he is merely 
stating (describing) that when we use language indicatively we, in fact, do expect evidence. It 
seems, in doing so, he is also drawing a distinction between rule following, referencing and 
understanding. The reason is as follows: Our particular type of use of language (such as 
metaphorical, factual, making commands and asking questions) must be apparent to us because it is 
with a particular intention that we use language in a particular way. If meaning is determined by 
this intentional use of language then meaning, unlike maybe grammatical rules, must be largely 
operative on a consciously cognitive level of our thinking and communicating. It seems quite 
natural to look at use as a surface aspect of linguistic practice and it therefore seems right to say 
that meaning (of some sorts of discourse) is derived from what we take ourselves to be doing, 
consciously and intentionally, when we make assertions (use language assertorically). When we 
make moral claims we are using language indicatively- we are claiming to be asserting facts. 
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The claim is that sense captures our intuitions about the cognitive aspect of meaning. Therefore, 
meaning theories which are concerned with remaining faithful to meaning not being a mysterious 
and inexplicable property of terms, which precedes referencing and sense, but sees meaning rather 
as a result of a speaker's interaction with his/her language and the world it claims to denote, must 
remain hostage to the notion of sense being a salient ingredient of meaning. The eventual 
conclusions about the relationship between sense and reference will constitute a part of the 
foundation of the argument for which model of meaning we ought to adopt. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Two semantic requirements: What requirements does our use of assertoric language place on 
semantic theory? 
When we say something like: "It is wrong to break a promise", the right question to ask is in what 
way are we using the assertion? And then, to really benefit from the full impact that such a question 
could make, in other words to really give it due attention, it is important to suspend, for the time 
being, any formal theories of the meta-ethical kind that we may have about, for instance, 
constructivist truth, mind independent moral properties or post modern subjectivism. To really get 
to grips with an investigation into how we use our moral language it is necessary to think of 
ourselves as moral agents and not as philosophers. So it seems that when someone makes an 
assertion such as the one above it is reasonably safe to assume that they believe themselves to be 
saying something true, that they may have, at least, one or two reasons to give as to why the 
assertion is true and that they probably even believe themselves to stating some sort of ultimate 
truth. Since all this is most likely a fact of the matter about the use of moral propositions it is 
reasonable to assume that the moral agent would think it morally wrong for someone to act in a 
way which seems to contradict the norms which seem, to the agent in question, implicit to the 
moral proposition. (This tendency to hold others to our own moral standards is also true for moral 
agents who think of moral deliberation as context or situation dependent for the reason that the 
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moral agent would most likely be of the opinion that we are all consistently bound by the same 
moral norms informed by a specific context. In such cases it is said that the moral facts do obtain 
but they are based in a particular set of circumstances. It would, however, be misleading to give the 
impression that this discussion is about whether or not moral reason is "principled" in some sense 
or whether it is "particularist". Rather, the discussion is about the fact that we tend to be realists in 
our use of moral statements and we do so because we believe ourselves to be tracking facts of a 
moral kind- whether these are overriding principles or situation dependent facts. In short, we are 
not, presently, interested in the metaphysics of moral facts but rather in whether or not speakers can 
show that they have access to the sorts of facts they need to have in order to legitimately use 
language in the way that they do.) 
What this means is that moral agents talk as if there exists some sort of objective moral fact of the 
matter. It is for this reason that philosophers such as Simon Blackburn and Crispin Wright, who 
both associate themselves with the anti-realist project, have acknowledged the importance of giving 
some account of our realism in moral language. Blackburn's notion of quasi-realism (a thesis that 
holds that we can peak as if we are realists about moral truth even though there are no moral facts) 
and Wright's insistence on arguing for the minimal truth aptness (this is a notion that assertions, 
when they have met some minimal syntactic constraints, which will be explained in more detail 
later, can be apt for a certain "type" of truth- not of the objective kind) of moral language are two 
examples of how we could be sensitive to this human tendency despite the fact that we may think 
of moral language as intrinsically flawed, unjustified, or some such thing. 
The suggestion is that there exists some tension between what we say as moral agents and what we 
are entitled to say. It is being supposed that, if all moral agents (speakers) were interested in the 
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meta-discourse around moral language, it would be found that realist intuitions do not correctly 
represent what speakers see themselves doing when making moral assertions. The question here is 
whether or not it seems right that we, as moral agents, think of our moral statements as true in the 
way a theorist who endorses realist notions of truth as determined by truth conditions (that state of 
affairs, which if it obtains, would make a statement true). The answer seems to be that we simply 
do not think of our moral statements as true in this way. This is because we simply do not think of 
our use of the truth predicate as sufficiently characterised by the Correspondence Principle (that a 
proposition is true iff it corresponds to the facts). In other words, in colloquial terms, when we are 
making assertions to truth we do not think in an idealised way about the truth of our statements. If 
you asked someone if they really believed their statement: "It is wrong not to be a Christian" to be 
true they would, almost certainly, not answer: "It is true if it happens to be the case." I do not think 
that my statement about it being wrong to break promises would be true if it were the case that it is 
wrong to break promises. What we do think, as moral agents, is that it is (not if it is) a fact that it is 
wrong to break promises (or that it is a fact that it is wrong not to be a Christian). We assume, in 
making the assertion, that we have already tracked the facts about the matter which is why we feel 
vindicated in asserting such facts. We do not think of ourselves as stating a conditional truth- which 
is what the Correspondence Principle implies. 
Thus, we do not think in "platitudes" (borrowing from Wright) and we do not use our language in 
such a way as to rest content with a conditional claim on truth. Now, if it transpires that our 
assumptions at having tracked these "moral facts" are inconsistent with our intuitions about what it 
means to use a language competently then we may be involved in a little bit of self deception. Our 
natural and enduring commitment to "evidence" may, if we are right about having such 
commitments, require a revision of our notions of when our language can be true and then our 
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tendency, as language users, to regard some of our assertions as true or false in the absence of the 
evidence which we so value. Either this or we must give up our commitments to evidence. What 
this throws into question is the usefulness of theoretical truth conditions as an aspect of language 
use. It seems as if we regard ourselves as competent language users not because we are able to 
imagine the facts that would make our assertions true but rather because we presume there are 
actual existing states of affairs which do so. And an assumption like the latter surely needs further 
epistemic support? 
Before we continue by looking at two of the semantic requirements of our linguistic practice (in 
order for our language to have the meaning we intend for it to have) let it be said that semantic 
requirements are taken to inform meaning theories (how we derive meaning) and what sort of 
semantic value (realist or anti-realist) our language is entitled to have. So if it emerges that 
language use is indeed not underpinned by something like the Correspondence Principle and 
theoretical truth conditions then this will call for a meaning theory which can, indeed, 
accommodate the following semantic requirements. 
It will be argued that an appeal to truth conditions, to establish the correct notions of use within a 
theory of meaning, cannot be accommodated by the requirements outlined below. And it seems as 
if the manifestation and acquisition requirements are, indeed, legitimate. 
Section 1; The Manifestation Requirement 
In her article, Semantic Challenges to Realism, Drew Khlentzos (2004) outlines the manifestation 
challenge to realism. It seems, Khlentzos sees the manifestation challenge as a semantic challenge 
and it runs, in short, something like this: "The challenge simply is this: what aspect of our linguistic 
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use could provide the necessary evidence for the realist's correlation between sentences and states 
of affairs? Which aspects of our semantic behaviour manifest our grasp of these correlations, 
assuming they hold?" (Khlentzos; 2004) 
I propose that we modify, slightly, the way Khlentzos has put it. Manifestation should be regarded 
a requirement for any semantic theory, realist or anti-realist. It should form part of the reason why 
we favour either of these semantic theories. Calling it the Manifestation Challenge for realism is, in 
effect, begging the question. Any semantic theory should be able to give an account of how 
language users manifest the link between their sentences and the world they wish to, and assume to, 
denote. But since, Khlentoz' argument runs, this will prove to be problematic for the realist, it then 
only becomes a specific challenge for the realist. (Of course, Khlentzos is not by any means the 
only theorist who challenges the realist project on the grounds of semantic requirements; this 
strategy is favoured by Dummett throughout much of his work, and another example of an author 
basing an argument, counter realism, on semantic challenges is Bob Hale in his article: Realism and 
its Oppositions; 1997.) 
It is of some importance, if the reader should want to refer directly to "Semantic Challenges to 
Realism" that some mention is made of the fact that this article sees yet another misconstrual of the 
anti-realist project. This misconstrual has a bearing on some of the conclusions reached about 
whether or not realism succeeds in evading the semantic "challenges" posed to it. Khlentzos insists 
that manifestation, according to the anti-realist, is only a problem for the realist because of the 
difficulty with mind independent objects. This way of putting it misses what is essentially, 
according to the type of anti-realist in question in this thesis, going to be problematic for the realist. 
It also suggests that all anti-realists are somehow committed to some sort of metaphysical 
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constructivism or idealism about some or all objects. This is simply not the case at all. There are 
many anti-realists who are very happy to accept the possibility and the actual fact about the 
existence of mind independent properties and objects. The point is, according to the anti-realist that 
the realist is going to have a problem with how to manifest the knowledge of the link between the 
world, moral facts, and the assertions which we make about these moral facts. So, it is less about 
existence of these facts than it is about knowledge of how our language tracks such facts. 
The question with which to continue is thus: What warrants our assertions if these happen to be of 
the fact stating kind? Surely this warrant will require some sort of manifestation of knowledge 
about how our fact stating assertions latch on to the world of which they speak? If it is not possible 
to manifest the knowledge of such a link (tracking) then it emerges that our language is not 
warranted- despite the fact that there may very well be such things as mind independent moral 
facts. 
It seems that the manifestation requirement does pose a problem for the realist about things such as 
moral facts. This is because [our] realist language is factualist by nature. I should like to emphasise 
the following once again: it is not being stated that realist language cannot and does not track moral 
facts, it is being claimed that the realist cannot always show that it does- certainly not in the case of 
moral facts. Khlentzos describes realist sentences as sentences which, in some discourses or theory, 
are to be construed as literally fact stating ones (2004). Factual language has, in effect, set itself up 
in such a way that it must accept, in order to comply with a basic semantic requirement for such 
language, a burden of proof- in this case the burden is to give an account of the speaker's 
manifestation of the knowledge of the link between their language and the world. The reason why it 
is not an effective evasion of the challenge, for the professors of the Correspondence Principle of 
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truth, to wield to such a definition of truth is because speakers in ordinary, everyday speak quite 
simply are not committed to hypothetical or conditional assertions when they are making moral 
claims. In other words, when I say "It is wrong to covet my neighbour's husband" I do not mean "If 
the moral facts, to which I have no access, are such that it is wrong to covet my neighbour's 
husband then I say, and it must be true, that it is wrong to covet my neighbour's husband." Meta-
ethicists may speak like this but moral agents do not. 
So, the truth conditions, implied by the Correspondence Principle, of a statement like the one above 
can be of no use to the realist in satisfying the manifestation requirement and thereby blocking the 
challenge. This is because, naturally, this raises a question about, if and when it seems to be the 
case that we cannot, as speakers, manifest in what the connection between our language and reality 
consists, then how are we really to come to grips with the content of our propositions? And it seems 
that forwarding imaginary and ideal conditions which would make the proposition true does not 
seem to fit with what we see ourselves doing in our linguistic practice. Does the manifestation 
requirement then ask for a revision of our linguistic practice, if this practice is so inherently realist? 
Section 2: The Acquisition Requirement 
Once again I think it preferable, for the same question begging reasons, not to immediately think of 
Language Acquisition as a challenge to realism. It should be thought of as a requirement in the 
formulation of any respectable semantic theory (realism or anti-realism) and both the would-be 
realist and anti-realist should be shouldered with the task of giving an account of how we acquire 
language or become competent language users. 
Taking the Acquisition Requirement to be saying something like: A competent language user is a 
speaker who has acquired the ability to correctly use language to denote facts. The claim will be 
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that the realist, as opposed to the anti-realist, has difficulty distinguishing between a competent and 
non-competent language user. However, the reason forwarded is not an impossible claim that those 
who believe there are real moral properties in the world should find it more difficult, compared 
with those who believe that there are no moral properties, to explain how we acquire language. 
This cannot be the reason because, firstly, anti-realists do not claim that there are no moral 
properties, they merely claim that there exists no satisfactory account of what such moral properties 
could be which means that speakers are not warranted in speaking of such things. And, secondly, in 
realist doctrine, where warrant is not a criterion for truth or meaning, it seems hard to see where the 
delineation between the competent and incompetent acquisition of language lies. In other words, 
whether or not the speaker is warranted in making a claim seems not to be a criterion for truth when 
the Correspondence Principle is seen as adequately accounting for truth. But it seems that if the 
Correspondence Principle is doing all the work in giving an account of truth, with no further 
constraints or criteria to support it, then anyone is surely permitted to make any sort of claim to 
truth- because as long as they can imagine what the truth conditions would be their statement is 
legitimate. It seems that the realist is implying that it is permissible for a moral agent to merely 
have a hunch about why they have some sort of moral commitment, something like saying it is 
permissible to be confident that someone is lying, if there is an accompanying feeling that can 
count as a reason for being confident in this way, without really being able to say whether such a 
feeling has any grounds in reality. If having hunches about things can act as reasons for 
commitments then anyone and everyone must be right about their commitments. And everyone and 
anyone must be competent language users. By looking at competency in language in such a way it 
seems quite evident that there exist no meaningful criteria for competent language acquisition. 
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It is my claim that realism, as described above, cannot give an account of competent language 
acquisition and that language acquisition therefore becomes a requirement (and challenge) of 
linguistic behaviour which realism, in particular, cannot meet. 
If the purpose of identifying semantic requirements for linguistic behaviour is to inform which 
semantic theories we should endorse for a specific discourse, then it seems as if manifestation and 
language acquisition favour some sort of theory which will emphasise the importance of sense as 
an aspect of referencing. The claim being forwarded is that the sense of a term is contained by 
exactly the sort of knowledge which needs to be manifested according to the manifestation 
challenge. In other words when we have manifested in what our individual [speaker] knowledge 
of the link between our language and the world consists we have given an account of what it is that 
we understand ourselves saying in using a certain term, and this is the sense of the term or 
proposition. We have, simply put, given an account of the contents of the term as we see it. 
Similarly, we can only regard ourselves as competent users of language when we can give an 
account of how we have tracked the facts of which we speak. This tracking does not merely refer to 
knowing of which object we speak, but entails that we know the content of the predicative 
statements which we make about such as object. In other words, we only consider someone a 
competent speaker when they can show how they know "Stealing is wrong" and this requires more 
than knowing that stealing is wrong. 
Are there any accounts of linguistic competence available to the realist? A realist may be of the 
type who agrees that competency is a real factor in language acquisition and stipulates that a 
competent speaker is merely one whose propositions corresponds to the facts. This is all fine and 
well for theorists of the verificationist type but this option is not available to the semantic realist: 
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Linguistic behaviour (in other words, speaker behaviour) does not subscribe to meta-linguistic 
theorising. Speakers either do or do not acquire a language and become competent users of it. There 
must be some substantive account of when this is the case because competence is not a hypothetical 
event, but an actual one. Our language is either legitimate or not and if we agree to this delineation 
(between legitimate and non-legitimate), then we have the burden of showing where exactly this 
delineation occurs and how we would recognise it when we see it. 
What then should an account of language acquisition and degrees of competence be premised on? 
If competent use of language is regarded as something like saying it right and this, again, is 
regarded as being the case when assertions have correctly represented the facts, we must surely be 
dealing with a case wherein factualist language is somehow constrained by "proof. There cannot 
be anything odd about this notion because it seems as if any person, or then theorist (not that these 
are mutually exclusive), of a realist or anti-realist type will concede that the concept of a "fact" 
must be a priori associated to the notion of "justification". It simply is the case that some statements 
are accepted as facts and some not, which means that agents within a particular discourse believe it 
an a priori fact that there are certain delineating criteria which can distinguish fact from those 
statements which pose to be facts. We can take a broad definition of such criteria to be the 
"justification" of certain statements. Apt and appropriate justification (this term is loosely used at 
present) is then what will distinguish a fact from a fallacy. And what will distinguish moral agents 
(or users of moral language) and realist and anti-realist philosophers from each other is what is 
regarded as being able to legitimately serve as justification for a factual assertion. At present, I shall 
withhold an argument and conclusion about whether a realist or anti-realist theorist is correct about 
what should serve as "justifications" because I believe, with Dummett, that this decision should be 
based on linguistic behaviour (use). This means, at pain of begging the question, our semantic 
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conclusions should be informed by our theories about use. And how we use our language is what 
has been the focus of discussion so far- but this investigation is not entirely complete. 
Both the manifestation requirement and the language acquisition requirement are based on an 
appeal to some kind of constraint put on language and to, therein, determine its legitimacy. This is 
because factualist language, which is the type under discussion, is necessarily (by definition) in 
need of a real and workable distinction between when we as speakers are stating facts and when 
not. And this need for establishing the exact place of delineation between a factual assertion and a 
fallacious one will premise theories about legitimate use (semantic theories). This is a self imposed 
distinction, imposed by our linguistic behaviour and epistemological commitments, which is seated 
at the foundations of any sort of theory about how we derive meaning. 
Before looking at how linguistic practice (use) will influence theories about meaning it is necessary 
to look at how semantic requirements relate to the distinction between sense and reference. Taking 
us to have concluded, conservatively, that speakers (if not theorists) expect evidence in support of 
their factual statements it seems that it may also be correct to want to add that not only is there a 
distinction between sense and reference but that sense does in fact determine reference. 
If the manifestation and acquisition requirements are related to speaker knowledge and speaker 
competence, then these requirements must surely be tied up with the sense of a term or proposition. 
But, if sense is additionally characterised by these requirements, what argument can be forwarded 
in support of why sense must determine reference? In other words, why should this sort of speaker 
knowledge be part of legitimising referencing? In forwarding an argument for why sense is related 
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to cognition (knowledge) and why sense should determine reference I refer to Dummett's 
distinction between the identity argument and the cognitive argument. 
Dummett says of Frege's notions of sense and reference: 
"Where the identity argument can be expressed by saying that to know the reference of a word is to know 
more than is involved in knowing its sense the cognitive argument may be stated, conversely, by saying that 
more is involved in knowing the sense than just knowing the reference: more exactly, that there cannot be 
such a thing as the bare knowledge of the reference of an expression." (1991: 126). 
What Dummett means by identity argument, which is the argument that proposes that reference is a 
necessary and sufficient ingredient of the meaning of a term, is that all that is necessary for 
knowing the meaning of a term is to be able to identify the object to which it refers. This, 
according to the identity argument can be done without an intimate knowledge of the object (or an 
understanding of what is meant when using a term). The thing to see now is how this fits with what 
we now know about moral language. 
When I say that "It is good to give money to the poor", I expect to be stating a fact. So when I use 
this proposition in a purely referential manner, in other words, when my knowledge of the 
proposition consists in my knowing to what I am making reference, my statement is capable of 
expressing, what Dummett calls, propositional knowledge (1991; 127). However, the claim is this 
does not give a complete description of what I am doing when I make such a statement. When I 
make a moral statement such as the one above I am not merely displaying a knowledge that "good" 
refers to (good) and "poor" to (poor). I am making a substantive claim of a factual kind. This means 
that I am employing predicative language. I am ascribing the actual property of moral goodness to 
an actual action of giving to the poor. When I am doing this, what Dummett calls ascriptions of 
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predicative knowledge-what, as in contrast to propositional knowledge-that, I am making claims to 
knowing something about the substantive content of my sentence. When doing this, as opposed to 
just correct referencing, it seems that the cognitive argument holds some theoretical advantage over 
the identity argument in its ability to describe how we employ language. In order to manifest 
knowledge of what it means when I say that an action X has a property Y, I shall need to manifest 
knowledge of its sense because knowing whether certain actions have certain properties requires an 
intimate knowledge of that action- an understanding of what is meant. It will not be enough to 
forward a platitude of "good" refers to (good) like "orange" refers to (orange). In order to make an 
ascription of predicative knowledge it is going to be necessary to display [manifest] a knowledge of 
the link between the term "good" and the property (good) and what this property could be. 
So manifestation and competent language use (for exactly the same reasons) will require the 
knowledge of the sense of a term for the reason that we expect more from our factual language than 
correct labelling. We expect evidence (intimate knowledge) of the referents. 
What follows in the last part of this chapter is a bridging between the concepts of manifestation, 
acquisition and truth (which is discussed in the following chapter). It is of great importance that the 
reader sees how the term "evidence" is to be taken and how it is borne from the notion of sense. If 
the argument about sense being integral to meaning is successful (and sense can be seen as very 
closely linked to the type of evidence required for truth and meaning by the Verification Principle) 
then a further argument in support of Verificationism will be so much easier to make. 
For theories of meaning the notion of truth is pivotal because most theorists and, in fact speakers, 
regard the meaning of their claims to be determined by what will make that claim true. But 
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meaning theories must, unlike theories about logic (thinking of classical logic) which assume a 
certain position about things like truth and is merely concerned with preserving truth values across 
inferential pathways, first establish a firm conception of truth. The reason for this is that a particular 
understanding of the notion of truth, in other words an understanding of what it would take for any 
sentence to be true, will be part of the justification of a proposition. And this justification forms 
part of how the speaker is entitled to determine the meaning of that particular proposition. So when 
it is said that "It is good to give money to the poor", it is going to be the moral fact of the matter 
which, if it obtains, will make my statement true. This is simple enough and is certainly 
uncontroversial. 
If such "facts" are to be construed as evidence then the question could be phrased like this: "Why 
can't there be evidence in support of the meaning of moral claims?" But it would be a mistake to 
see an argument forwarding the notion that we expect evidence in support of our assertoric 
language to be simultaneously claiming that there is or is not such evidence available. The latter is 
a separate argument altogether. The first step in establishing a verificationist theory about meaning 
is going to be to convince the reader that meaning should be derived in a particular way, e.g. by 
way of verification conditions (evidence). This, in itself does not presuppose that there are no such 
conditions. It is then a further argument which will state that there are no such conditions, such as 
the arguments which error theorists and expressivist theorists make. This is a further step which I 
assume most verificationist theorists would be loathe take, for the very reason that such claims, 
about the absence of moral facts, are just not verifiable. These claims are not verifiable for the same 
reasons that moral claims, which depend on the existence of moral facts, are not verifiable- we 
simply cannot say what exactly we are looking for in attempting to detect moral properties- which 
surely is what will comprise a moral fact? 
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Even though I do not see it as part of the ambitions of this thesis to establish the metaphysics of 
moral facts, in fact, the very essence of this thesis is sided against such an investigation, I do 
concede that it is going to be difficult to avoid at least a stipulation regarding the metaphysics of 
moral facts. The purpose of offering a stipulation would be that any reader who is convinced of the 
existence of such moral facts is going to come up repeatedly against some of the central tenets of 
this thesis. So, let it suffice to be said that I take moral facts to denote, what some would qualify as, 
moral properties of the real world. But this thesis is premised on something like the Humean and 
earlier Wittgensteinian notion of a distinction between fact and value. It is my contention that it 
simply is not obvious in any way that the natural and real world is partially constituted by things 
such as moral properties available to the keen and astute observer or moral judge. There seems to 
be no meaningful way to distinguish between what we think we are observing when we see, at 
times, the natural world as normative and other more widely accepted illusions, such as gods and 
angels. But this stipulation may seem to commit this project to something like error theories or 
expressivist theories- and this would be a very big mistake. It is my claim that the moral realist, 
whether of the naturalist or rationalist stripe, has a burden of proof which, to my knowledge, has 
not been addressed adequately. It is, therefore, not my claim that there are no moral facts (or moral 
properties) - even though I doubt that there is for the same reasons as Hume and Wittgenstein - but 
rather that there is no way available to the moral realist of showing to the skeptic how one would be 
able to recognise such properties, and what the criteria are for distinguishing them from value 
neutral properties, and where to find them. Even though this case is far from adequate I rest it 
anyway. 
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What we have thus far is a claim that meaning is determined by what would make a proposition 
true, and that what would make a proposition true could be construed as its verification conditions, 
not its truth conditions. Which one we should regard as the correct criterion for truth is the work of 
the rest of the thesis. 
Part of an argument for the aptness of the manifestation and acquisition requirements is premised 
on the understanding of the content of the sentence. Bemhard Weiss, in his book Michael Dummett, 
defines the manifestation of this understanding thus: "...an exercise of an appropriate recognitional 
capacity (a capacity to recognise the sentence as true or as assertible or, perhaps, a sensitivity to 
whether or not presented evidence justifies the assertion of the sentence)..." (2002; 71). 
Weiss describes the pathway to meaning as follows (2002; 114): linguistic practice has two 
elements which are fundamental to it and the achievement of meaning. The first is the logical 
nature of language which is informed, implicitly and unconsciously, by inferential rules. This 
aspect of our practice enables us to speak coherently, ensuring that (hopefully) our sentences are 
syntactically sound and our arguments are validly deduced. The second element of linguistic 
practice is fully conscious and rational and is what enables us to gain referential knowledge via our 
knowledge of sense. It should not be difficult, by now, to understand why this aspect of our 
linguistic practice must be fully conscious and rational. The reason for this is because the 
identification of evidence for a statement, which is based on a knowledge of the content being 
referred to, must be done using perceptual faculties capable of influencing a decision about the 
truth value of the sentence. Recognition of evidence is not a reflex and conferring truth is not a 
necessity. So, for instance, if it transpires to be a temptation to argue that moral truths are necessary 
truths this would need some explaining because this fact, in itself, is not self evident. An argument 
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for moral truth being necessary truth will have to be supported, and preceded, by an argument for 
moral statements being analytical statements. Until this has been successfully achieved, which to 
my knowledge it has not, we must assume moral claims to be of the contingent type. And 
contingent truths can only be derived from a posteriori knowledge. Hence, the claim that we would 
require perceptual faculties in order to recognise moral facts (the conditions which would make 
moral claims true/false). And it seems to me quite evident that it has been impossible to show what 
we shall "perceive" in finding such truth conditions. And even if it can be shown what we shall 
perceive, additional evidence will be required to show that such truth conditions are not aspects of 
our imaginations (something like a projection) but are, in fact, aspects of an objective reality. 
Truth conditions, such as those implied by the Correspondence Principle, cannot serve as the sort of 
evidence we expect from factual language. So, if Weiss is correct in his description of how we 
acquire meaning, and we have largely already argued for a position like his (by arguing: 1. that 
partially we achieve meaning by grammatical correctness and 2. that we require an intimate 
knowledge of the sense of a term or proposition) and if the semantic requirements place the right 
sorts of self imposed constraints on our language use, then it is just a short step to showing that 
meaning is verification conditions. What we have now is that the matters of fact which will make a 
proposition true or false cannot be hypothetical truth conditions, but must be actual evidence we 
have in support of our propositions and that we must be able to manifest knowledge of such 
evidence. This is partly due to the fact that sense must determine reference if we, in making for 
instance moral claims, are not satisfied merely with the vacuous labelling of referents. If evidence 
is the condition for conferring a truth value on a proposition then we, quite simply, have an 
evidentially constrained notion of truth at the basis of our theory of meaning. I have already 
indicated that a discussion on the intricate relationship between meaning and truth is left for the 
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next chapter. We shall see that meaning theories will determine what the conditions for warrant 
(legitimate use) are for our assertions. In other words, it seems as if there is tension between what 
we expect to be doing when employing a certain linguistic practice and what we can, in fact, 
accomplish with our full and conscious understanding. It may transpire that in our attempt to meet 
with our own semantic requirements our actual linguistic practice, in certain discourses, stands in 
need of revision. 
It seems, then, as if it is right to say that speakers expect evidence in support of their assertoric 
claims. The Manifestation and Acquisition semantic challenges presuppose this about our linguistic 
behaviour and it is for this reason that they are very effectively forwarded as a challenge against 
realism. However, the reason why these are successfully posed as challenges to realism is also 
because these two semantic challenges assume truth (of assertoric language) to be evidentially 
constrained. If, however, it emerges that truth is better conceived as evidence transcendent then 
realism still has a way of resisting these semantic challenges. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Two conceptions of truth: What are the reasons for and the implications of acceptin2 either 
conception of truth? 
If achieving truth is regarded as possible without any knowledge of the relevant facts, then it may 
transpire that truth conditions can still serve to resist the semantic challenges of Manifestation and 
Acquisition. This chapter looks at which conception of truth, evidence transcendent or evidentially 
constrained, is correct. The conclusion will run in favour of evidentially constrained truth based on, 
as with most of the preceding argumentation within this thesis, use. The implication of proposing 
that truth be evidentially constrained is that verification conditions, as opposed to truth conditions, 
should be regarded as that which would make a proposition true. 
Most theorists acknowledge that we may sometimes say things that are true without realising this to 
be the case. This characteristic of truth has become such a seductive option for how truth could be 
construed formally that it has informed much of what is claimed about truth, language and even 
metaphysics. What such a construal of truth permits, but does not entail, conceptually and 
theoretically, is that we can assume that all our propositions are either true or false, whether we 
have some way of knowing this determinate truth value or not. In other words, we can rest content 
that, provided our assertions have met some very basic justificatory constraints, such as elementary 
plausibility, consistency with existing facts, coherence within a larger argument and syntactical 
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correctness, it is going to be a fact that such assertions will either be true or false even within the 
absence of knowledge of which this is. It is from the notion that reasonable propositions must either 
register the facts or not and therefore be either true or not that we conclude that any reasonable (as 
above) proposition must have a determinate truth value. 
However, is it necessarily the case that all reasonable propositions must have a determinate truth 
value? In other words, may there not be instances that (or certain ways in which to construe truth 
which) insist that not all propositions must be either true or false? My suggestion is that there are 
propositions which, because of the way in which they are phrased and the terminology which they 
employ, may be apt for truth but cannot be shown, determinately, to have achieved an actual truth 
value. This claim will be premised on truth being construed as evidentially constrained. Hence, if 
the notion of truth which permits the inference that all statements are determinately either true or 
false proves to be wrong this may enable a move towards the conclusion that some propositions are 
indeterminate. 
In order to successfully counter an argument for why all propositions must have a determinate truth 
value we need to pay credence to the notion of falsification. It is quite apparent that the absence of 
evidence for the existence or presence of X does not necessarily constitute a proof for the absence 
or non-existence of X. In other words, in order to prove that X does not exist we need proof of that 
fact, not merely a lack of proof for its existence. So, when I walk into an empty room and cannot 
see a chair therein I can legitimately assert that there is no chair in that room. However, if I walk 
into a room and the room is empty save for a big box in the middle, of which I am not permitted 
access to the content, then I only have proof of the existence of a box in the room but I certainly do 
not have proof of the absence of a chair. In order to have this sort of proof I would need to be able 
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to access the contents of the box to see whether it is empty, contains a chair or some other object or 
is, in fact, a solid cube. Only then can I safely say, having scrutinized all the possible extensions of 
the room that I have proof of there not being a chair in the room. 
Statements which do not allow for conclusive falsification or verification (even in principle) must 
be of a particular type. They are of the type which cannot be shown to be either true or false. If 
however, truth is defined: "X" is true iff X is the case, then it is argued that all statements, by 
definition, will be either true or false, even if we cannot determine which. By this definition of truth 
all statements are, a priori, true or false. And this is exactly what the Law of the Excluded Middle 
maintains. It transpires then that an example such as the one above does not get us to a rejection of 
this law because it will, and should if this law is correct, be maintained that an assertion like "There 
is a chair in that room" will be shown to be true or false when I do have access to the contents of 
that box. In other words, if I were to open that box it can only make my statement either true or 
false because there either is or is not a chair in that box. Which means that, in principle, I may 
safely assert that the statement "There is a chair in that room", will be either true or false, whether I 
look in the box for it or not. But this is because it is, in principle, possible to falsify and verify the 
statement. It is my claim that this is unproblematic because I know what I should be looking for 
when I open that box in order to know whether there is or is not a chair inside. However, assume 
the proposition said: "There is a maximonis in that box". On opening the box I see that it is filled 
with many different objects, some of which I recognise and some which I have never seen before. I 
can remove all the objects which I know not to be a maximonis (because I know that they are, for 
instance pens, pencils and paints) from the box and put them to one side. I may say, referring to the 
removed objects, and knowing this to be true; "None of these objects is a maximonis" but I cannot 
say; "There is no maximonis in this box" is either true or false. The reason for this is that I do not 
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know what I am looking for. I have no real criteria by which to identify a maximonis. I could 
extend my search throughout the whole of the universe and will never know whether or not I have 
found a maximonis because there will be objects which I do not know the names of and I have no 
substantive criteria by which to recognise a maximonis when I see it. For instance, I may look 
under a microscope and see many strange and (to me) nameless organisms and it will be impossible 
to say whether or not they are what I am looking for. Nor will I be able to say whether not one of 
those nameless objects is, indeed, not a maximonis. 
But this example has still not done the necessary work of showing that even a statement making 
reference to an unknown object will not be determinately true or false. This is because even if I 
cannot say what a maximonis is, it will still be either true or not (in principle) that there is one in 
the box. If it happens to be the case that there is no such thing as a maximonis then, the statement 
simply cannot be true for the very reason that a maximonis does not exist. And if there is such a 
thing as a maximonis then it simply will be the case that there is or is not one in the box- which 
means the statement must be either true or false irrespective of whether or not such an object exists 
and whether or not I know this to be the case. 
But all of the above hinges on a particular conception of truth. And this particular conception is 
one of truth being regarded as evidence transcendent. The reason is this: if truth is evidence 
transcendent then my lack of knowledge of what a maximonis is will have no bearing on whether 
or not a proposition about its existence will be true or not. It simply can be assumed that either such 
an object does exist or it does not- this is tautologically true. And this must mean that my statement 
must be either true or false, even if I do not know which one. The only way to resist such an 
argument for determinate truth based on truth being evidence transcendent is to argue that truth 
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should be evidentially constrained. Before forwarding a defence for truth being evidentially 
constrained I would like to pose a question: If it emerges that the right way to construe truth is truth 
as evidentially constrained and that this, somehow, entails that truth is something which can only 
be settled by the language user then an a priori principle that all propositions must, logically, either 
be true or false surely becomes indefensible? This is because truth then has a different meaning 
which means that different inferences will be valid. 
I would like to consider two possible ways in which to think of truth: 
Section 1: Evidentially constrained truth 
An evidentially constrained notion of truth has two clauses characterising it and an evidence 
transcendent notion of truth has only one clause. The first clause which characterises evidentially 
constrained truth (also called an epistemic notion of truth) specifies that truth is, in a manner of 
speaking, a status which some of our propositions may obtain when certain conditions have been 
fulfilled. So this sense of truth characterises truth as a status of a proposition when it has satisfied 
certain conditions. What exactly are these conditions of which the first clause speaks? Quite simply 
and relatively uncontroversially, they are a proposition's truth conditions. Truth conditions refer to 
the content of an assertion which, if the assertion is able to denote accurately, would make the 
assertion true. Truth conditions are, therefore, thought of as states of affairs in the world which 
language attempts to represent, and either does or does not successfully do. 
An evidentially constrained notion of truth has, in addition to the first clause of this notion of truth, 
the further specification, or clause, that in order to make a claim to truth, in other words, a claim 
that the proposition has met such truth conditions, it must be possible for the speaker (user) of the 
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proposition to manifest how they know that the proposition has satisfied such conditions. We see 
here a construal of truth which has two interdependent clauses working together to stipulate what 
truth is. It is only the second clause, regarding the manifestation of knowledge of the proposition 
having met the requirements forwarded by the first clause, which is essential to an evidentially 
constrained notion of truth because the first clause it shares with an evidence transcendent notion of 
truth. (We shall discuss this shortly, though.) 
From the above it should be evident that truth, as an epistemic notion, has everything to do with the 
capacity of the speaker. It cannot be the case, by an epistemic notion of truth, that achieving truth 
has anything to do with the linguistic community because when a speaker says something they are 
only warranted in saying this if they have access to the knowledge of what would make such a 
statement true. When a lay person says "Light can bend under certain conditions" but has no 
knowledge of the facts that would make this true they are, by an epistemic notion of truth, not 
warranted in making this claim even if it happens to be absolutely true. It is only the experimenter 
or scientist (or even informed lay person) who knows the facts that would make such a statement 
true, who is warranted in making such a claim. An epistemic notion of truth asks for a cognitive 
component in the definition of truth itself. Truth, in this sense, is not just a status of a linguistic 
item but is, rather, the status of the speaker's knowledge of the linguistic item and its relationship 
with certain states of affairs. It is when truth is construed as an epistemic concept of sorts that we 
think of it as a result of having established when the speaker is warranted in making certain 
propositions and when not. In other words, truth is the status of a linguistic construct only when the 
speaker is able to explain the relationship between the construct and world it refers to and is 
therefore warranted in doing so. Truth, therefore, becomes something like warranted assertibility. 
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Truth being something like warranted assertibility entails that, according to such an epistemic 
notion of truth, many proposition will remain indeterminate in truth value. This is because an 
epistemic notion of truth holds that wielding the truth predicate (that aspect of a sentence which 
either implies or overtly states that the sentence is making a claim to truth) there exists no 
appropriate speaker knowledge is illegitimate. And we are not warranted unless we can say how we 
know the truth predicate bearing sentence to have tracked the intended matters of fact. Note that it 
is not being claimed that some propositions are indeterminate in truth value for the reason that there 
are no states of affairs which they can denote- this would be a metaphysical presupposition. The 
claim, simply, is that if we do not have the right sort of access to the facts and cannot say in what 
way we do when we think we have access to the facts, there is simply no manner in which we can 
determine the truth value of certain propositions. Hence, some propositions being indeterminate in 
truth. And, it seems, this conclusion hinges entirely on a particular construal of truth- that it is 
evidentially constrained and, therefore, epistemically defined. Revisiting, briefly, our example from 
above: The reason why a claim such as "There is a maximonis in that box" is indeterminate in truth 
value is not because we assume there is no such a thing as a maximonis, but rather because we have 
no way of telling (knowing/determining) when our propositions will be true. 
According to Weiss (2002; 107), Dummett lists four criteria for when we can take a sentence to be 
correctly asserted (true), in other words, when there is warrant for its assertion. The first is that it 
should be asserted on the basis of inductive evidence. Secondly, it must be capable of being used as 
a basis for inference, thirdly, that it can be correctly denied in certain circumstances and fourthly, 
that one should withhold judgement about its truth or falsity in certain circumstances. In short, 
Dummett will have it that moral claims cannot merely (only) form part of a deductively valid 
inference, but should be based on inductive (empirical) evidence. We should also be able to falsify 
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it. Referring back to our discussion about the importance of falsification we can see how much 
more conclusive evidence has to be in order to provide reasons for falsification. Thinking, then, of 
what a moral fact would be in order to determine, by Dummett's standards, whether moral 
language is warranted: Are moral claims ever asserted on the basis of inductive evidence? And, in 
the light of much uncertainty about what exactly a moral fact looks like, are ever going to be able to 
deny moral claims? 
Section 2: Evidence transcendent truth 
On the other hand truth is construed, only, as the status of a proposition if it has met certain 
conditions, namely its truth conditions. Without the further clause, as proposed by an evidentially 
constrained notion of truth, namely that of the speaker's knowledge of whether or not the truth 
conditions have (or can) in fact be met, it transpires that truth remains an ideal. But this claim 
seems hasty at this stage so let's look more carefully at what is being proposed. 
It seems that it is a logical truth, a tautology in fact, that truth conditions either will or will not be 
met. To demonstrate: Take a moral claim such as: "It is good to give money to the poor". A claim 
such as this one will be true if there is a moral fact, it actually being good to give money to the 
poor, which obtains. However, if there is no such fact at all or the morally relevant fact is 
characterised differently, such as that it is bad to give money to the poor, then the claim, "It is good 
to give money to the poor" will be false. It is easy to see that truth conditions are a way of 
theoretically setting the bar for truth. Furthermore, it seems nothing short of a logical necessity to 
state that it must be the case that statements will or will not meet such truth conditions. And since it 
must be the case that statements do or do not meet their truth conditions it is wrong to speak of a 
situation in which statements will not do either. This is just not a logical possibility. It seems 
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therefore that from the premise of truth being directly related to the notion of truth conditions we 
must deduce that the middle, that possibility of some statements not either meeting or not meeting 
their truth conditions, is excluded. In effect, what has just been described is the Law of Bivalence; 
which states that "there are exactly two truth values, true and false, and that, within a certain area of 
discourse, every statement has exactly one of them" (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy; 78). 
But it seems that, when truth is regarded an epistemic notion, and we cannot rest content with a 
conditional way (meeting hypothetical truth conditions) of defining truth, we must allow for the 
determinate truth value of some statements not being obtainable. The reason for this is simple: if 
the speaker does not have the necessary knowledge to establish whether or not a statement does or 
can meet its truth conditions then this statement remains indeterminate (because determinacy is 
something which depends on some cognitive relationship between the speaker and the conditions 
which would make the statement true). This means that according to an evidentially constrained 
notion of truth indeterminacy is a real possibility. 
The linguistic turn in philosophy saw, among other things, an adoption by some of an epistemic 
notion of truth. The reason for this is that analytical philosophy, as we have said in chapter one, is 
premised on empirical (scientific) foundations, which occurred as an attempt to counter the obscure 
and highly speculative philosophy which had, up until that point, been the order of the day. We 
know science, in part, for one defining quality it has; that all legitimate and respectable scientific 
theories must, at least, be testable (by the proponents of and oppositions to the theory). It is exactly 
this principle, the testability of scientific theories, which gives rise to an evidentially constrained 
notion of truth. This is because a truth conditional understanding of truth does not, in itself, require 
the speaker (scientist) to demonstrate or explain how the truth of his/her claim (theory), can be 
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verified (tested). I suggest, regarding the matter of truth, that if we claim to be saying something 
true, and we are averse to the slippery slope of a speculative philosophy, we must by necessity 
commit to an evidentially constrained notion of truth. 
What we have so far then is a commitment to truth as evidentially constrained. Adopting this 
conception of truth must have certain implications for some foundational principles of philosophy. 
The rest of this chapter consists of an investigation of whether or not it is possible to continue 
endorsing Classical Logic when one of the foundational principles, the Principle of Bivalence, 
cannot be sustained under an epistemic notion of truth. The conclusion is that it may stand to reason 
to reject Classical Logic in situations where no evidence is available for the determining of the truth 
or falsity of a proposition. 
Classical logic is based on the rule of the excluded middle, and truth as evidence transcendent is 
regarded, therefore, by some (such as Dummett) as the cornerstone of Classical Logic. 
Classification of the conclusions of arguments as determinately true or false, and even just basic 
assertions as always being either true or false, or assuming that they will be either true or false 
under ideal epistemic conditions, means that we have excluded the possibility that some assertions 
and some conclusions of arguments may not be either of these values for the reason that not all 
epistemic conditions are ideal. Classical logic regards the fact that we sometimes just do not have 
access to the facts or non-existence of facts as irrelevant to the definition of truth. 
The problem with the type of reasoning that maintains all assertions are either true or false is that it 
is guilty of begging the question. (Begging the question being when an argument assumes at the 
level of its premises what it is central to its conclusion.) By excluding the logical possibility of 
some propositions being neither true nor false, the Principle of Bivalence assumes that the nature of 
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knowledge is such that propositions about the world can be treated in the same way as 
mathematical and logical propositions. When it is maintained that our propositions will always be 
either true or false, whether we are capable of showing this or not, we must be appealing to an 
evidence transcendent notion of truth. Evidence transcendent truth may be appropriate for 
situations wherein the truths of propositions will be, when settled, necessary truths. The reason is 
most likely related to the fact that rational proofs are not based on contingent knowledge. And it is 
for the reason that the real world is not one of necessity that evidence of contingent facts must 
settle truths about reality. And tautologies, such as the Principle of Bivalence, even though useful in 
mathematics and formal logic, are unhelpful when it comes to knowledge about contingent 
existence and therefore Classical logic begs the very question at heart (what is true about reality) 
when it assumes that such truths can be settled in the same way as analytical truths. 
We have concluded that not all propositions are determinate in truth value. Additionally it is 
proposed that moral propositions are of the "indeterminate in truth value" kind because they are not 
analytically true and so must be synthetically so. But if truth is evidentially constrained, is the 
claim, it is hard to see what sort of contingent knowledge will settle the truth of moral propositions. 
My contention is therefore that no respectable category of knowledge, the synthetic a posteriori and 
the analytic a priori, has successfully accounted for moral properties and therefore moral facts. 
It now remains to be seen what such a conclusion entails for the meaning of moral propositions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Truth and meaning; If truth is evidentially constrained then what is meaning? 
Section 1: Truth aptitude 
This chapter aims to establish what meaning moral language is capable of if truth is taken to be 
evidentially constrained and truth and meaning are related. It has already been forwarded that 
meaning is determined by the conditions we think would make our propositions true. In other 
words, when using language assertorically we mean to accurately denote states of affairs in the real 
world. But if establishing this truth can only be legitimate by way of verification conditions then 
this must enable the inference that somehow meaning is also derived from verification conditions. 
Is this the case for moral language? 
I shall begin by looking whether or not moral language is even apt for truth by drawing from 
Dummett and Wright's theories on truth aptness. The conclusion will be that moral language is, 
indeed, apt for truth. The eventual aim will be to show that, even though moral language is in 
principle apt for truth, because the actual truth value of its propositions is indeterminate, its 
meaning must also remain indeterminate. 
Dummett maintains that it is fundamental to the nature of assertoric language that it be capable of 
being correct or incorrect (1977; 371). It is hard to imagine how anyone could disagree with this 
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statement. We only need to imagine how the character of communication would change if we all 
spoke in such a way so as to say things which we knew full well could never be established as 
either true or false. And it is irrelevant to object to the previous statement stating that propositions 
may still be capable of being true or false because we are working within a conception of truth 
being regarded as evidentially constrained. It seems quite simply to be part of assertoric linguistic 
behaviour that propositions being capable of being false or true must be detectably so. 
It is claimed by Dummett (1977; 374) that some statements' truth conditions cannot be stated 
without circularity and among these there may be some whose truth conditions do hold but we may 
have no way of knowing when this is the case. Moral language must be a case in point. A claim 
such as "Murder is wrong if murder is wrong" seems very much like circular reasoning. But even if 
it is probable that moral statements can be substantively true or false, and not just tautologically so, 
we simply cannot know in what way this is to be so and how we would recognise a substantively 
true or false moral claim when we see one (see Chapter 3; 75). 
What we have is that moral statements cannot be true or false (or that their truth value is 
indeterminate) but a vague suggestion that moral claims may yet be apt for truth (because moral 
language is assertoric and must therefore be assumed to be capable of being either correct or 
incorrect; see pg 91). In Truth and Objectivity Wright says (1992; 27) that when we accept neutral 
[metaphysical] grounds any discourse can count as truth apt provided it meets with certain 
conditions. Amongst these are that it counts as assertoric discourse. And it being counted as 
assertoric is determined by whether or not it can be embedded as an antecedent and a consequent of 
a conditional statement. Wright continues; that the truth predicate of such statements are partially 
characterised by the Disquotational Schema (which is that no substantive fact is imported to a 
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statement by stipulating that "it is true") and that such utterances are governed by norms of 
warranted assertibility. However, outlining these conditions for assertions does not conclude, by 
any means, whether or not moral discourse meets with Wright's conditions or whether these are 
even the right conditions by which to identify assertoric discourse. 
It seems quite evident that moral statements are factual by nature. This we can easily see by the use 
we make of them. We have already argued, in the previous chapter, that when we use language in a 
factual manner we expect the truth predicate of such statements to be constrained in some way or 
another. This is an a priori fact about "facts". Implied by the definition of a fact is that it is different 
to another sort of statement which has not managed to achieve this factual status. In other words, it 
is a priori necessary to think of factual type of statements as being capable of being either correct or 
not. A statement like "It is wrong not to return my friend's dictionary to her." is intended to be 
saying something true. It is said in the hope of correctly corresponding to certain moral facts. But 
being "correct" would only make sense if it were possible for the statement to be "incorrect", and in 
order to set up a discourse so that this distinction is a reality (and can be recognised as this), and not 
just a vacuous act of referencing, there must be substantive norms for when our assertions are 
warranted. The fact that we think of our moral language as capable of being mcorrect, or not, 
means that we expect it to be subject to certain norms. 
Can a statement such as "It is wrong not to return my friend's dictionary to her" be embedded as 
either an antecedent or consequent of a conditional statement? It seems it can. As an antecedent: "If 
it is wrong to not return my friend's dictionary to her then I should return it as soon as possible." 
And as a consequent: "I should return my friend's dictionary to her if it is wrong not to return my 
friend's dictionary to her." This is easily done but is this characteristic a necessary condition for 
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identifying the primary statement as assertoric? It seems to be the case that all statements which 
want to be regarded as assertoric should, at least, be able to function in such ways, because aspects 
of conditional statements serve as truth predicates. This is because an antecedent or consequent, 
being shown to be either true or false, does have a bearing on determining the truth value of the 
whole conditional statement. In fact, the antecedent and consequent bear on the truth of the whole 
statement regardless of whether they have been shown to be true or false themselves. Such an 
embedded assertion is, if we want to determine the truth value of the conditional, subject to the 
same norms as a statement which is not embedded in a conditional. Conditional statements state 
that there exists a very particular relationship between the truths of two separate statements (the 
antecedent and consequent). This relation is what is at stake when we speak about the truth 
predicates of conditional statements being subject to norms. But is Wight right about it being a 
necessary criterion of assertions to be able to be embedded in conditionals? If it were not possible 
for statements to be embedded in conditionals it would have to be because of their logical form. So 
any statement which is truth apt (will be partly due to their logical form) should be able to be part 
of a conditional statement. Indicative statements can and are therefore to be regarded as assertoric. 
To conclude this section on truth aptitude: "On my view, truth aptitude is relatively easily earned: 
and once a discourse is recognised as truth apt, the default view should be that claims to truth 
within it are justified by satisfaction of its proper standards of warrant." (1998; p 192) The 
aforementioned conditions forwarded by Wright in order for a discourse to be deemed truth apt are 
really just grammatical. He has placed no substantive criteria on what would then actually make a 
sentence true, in other words, warrant its assertion. Truth aptitude is easily earned because it seems 
right to start from a metaphysically neutral basis. And this is because, by this grammatical 
definition of what assertions can be truth apt, it is not necessary to have settled metaphysical 
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disputes, such as those around the existence of moral properties prior to establishing whether or 
not certain claims about such things can be apt for truth. Once we are free of metaphysical 
presuppositions which would confound our arguments with circular reasoning it seems that any 
discourse which is assertoric in its grammatical structure should be apt for truth. Problematic 
content (as in mysterious objects or properties) will, therefore, not affect, what Wright calls, 
minimal truth aptitude. When a discourse is minimally truth apt it is only up for truth determined by 
norms within that discourse itself. In other words, such a discourse will not necessarily be up for 
the type of objective truth asked for discourses within empirical sciences etc. Wright seems to 
regard moral language as minimally truth apt because the norms for warrant are norms which are 
awarded by the nature of moral language itself (1992; 61). This position of Wright's is not 
necessarily endorsed here but we shall return to this option a little later on (pg 105, 108). But 
discourse which is only minimally truth apt can only yield truth of a minimal kind because such 
assertions would then still be subject to proper standards of warrant in order to legitimately make 
claims on truth (of the objective, mind-independent type) itself. Discourses, which cannot meet the 
further conditions for warrant, presumably only ever remain minimally true because they comply, 
only, with certain minimal grammatical and internal norms. 
Section 2; Truth and Meaning 
I have already made explicit my commitments to why moral truths cannot be analytical truths and 
then continued, by way of showing that moral truths could therefore only be synthetic truths, 
knowledge of such truths would be impossible because a posteriori knowledge of moral properties 
is impossible. It is, however, still necessary to revisit these claims in order to present a more 
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thorough argument for why we shall be concluding that the meaning of moral language is 
indeterminate. 
"All bachelors are unmarried men" is necessarily true because it is true by definition, which means 
there is no possible world in which a bachelor could not be an unmarried man. If we were to find an 
unmarried man he simply would not be called a bachelor. (Thoughts about the analytic has a 
tendency to raise Quinian theory but we are not going to, at this stage, entertain Quine's objections 
to the analytic-synthetic distinction.) Synthetic truth, on the other hand, is the sort of truth a 
statement would have if it were made true or false by circumstances or matters of fact. "It is raining 
outside" is only true if it is actually the case that it is raining outside. Scientific truths are synthetic 
truths because it is part of the very nature of science that it is contingent and therefore revisable and 
that we come by these truths by way of sensory experience. If this were not the case it would be 
merely stating tautological truths which are not very useful for getting to know anything about the 
real world. 
I would like to rule out the possibility of arguing that moral claims, if correct, are analytically true 
or yield a priori knowledge. In order for the statement, "Killing human beings is wrong", to be 
analytically true it must be shown that "killing human beings" is identical in meaning to "wrong". 
It will have to be shown that this is a logical necessity. It does not seem hard to see that this simply 
is not the case. Logical truths, by their very nature, are self-evident. Admittedly, there may be some 
theorists who will argue that a proof can be provided for the fact that one can get "wrong" from 
"killing a human being". It is my claim that it would be impossible to present such a proof without 
making an appeal, at some stage of the proof, to an a posteriori claim which will be only 
contingently true. This would, needless to say, immediately invalidate the hoped for necessary 
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nature of the conclusion. It is easy to demonstrate the difference between the analyticity of a 
statement like "All bachelors are unmarried men" and the supposed analyticity of a statement like 
"Murder is wrong". Bachelors are unmarried men in all possible worlds but murder, even in this 
one world, is not always deemed wrong. Even murder is context dependent- which makes such a 
statement only contingently true if true at all. 
Whether we are particularists (theorists who state that reasons for action are determined by specific 
and context determined matters of fact) or theorists who propose that moral deliberation and action 
are principle driven it will be equally hard to argue, if this were desired, that moral claims are 
necessarily true. The particularist would have to show that what seems like contingent facts can 
serve as moral facts and that these are not revisable, in a given context, in any way and are 
therefore to be regarded as necessary. And principle theorists would have to show how principles 
are necessary truths which, despite the sincere efforts of some of the most important philosophers 
(starting with Plato right through to Kant) over the last few centuries, has still not been achieved. 
A successful argument for moral claims being analytically true will see a very interesting and 
hugely important shift in meta-ethical discourse. Until then, we must rest content with moral 
claims, if ever true at all, only being contingently so. Admittedly this is not a conclusion which has 
been argued for extensively but it the sort of claim which poses itself as a challenge: Can any 
theorist really show that moral truths are analytical (or, for that matter, a species of necessary 
truths)? And if they are not this then surely they must, by necessity, be contingent- if we take these 
to be the only valid categories of truths. 
But let us see if moral statements can even be contingently true. 
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In the previous chapter we argued that sense should be considered a central ingredient of 
referencing. The reason for this, it was said, is that meaning is not just a matter of denoting the right 
object. Meaning is to quite a large extent derived from the way in which the speaker uses the term, 
or understands by the term. And the speaker's understanding of a term (sense of the term) must be 
informed by the knowledge they have of the contents of the term. Dummett (1978; 118) puts it like 
this in his discussion about Frege's distinction between sense and reference: "Force is thus one 
aspect of meaning, to be distinguished from that ingredient of the meanings of the words which 
goes to determine the condition under which the sentence is true. This latter ingredient Frege calls 
sense..." Knowledge of sense must be predicate knowledge, according to Dummett. The conditions 
which we must know in order to establish the truth of a sentence is not just going to be 
propositional knowledge. This is because knowledge of the soundness of a proposition must be the 
sort of knowledge which is about the properties of reality. It must be the type of knowledge we 
have when we know the predicative claims within a proposition. And this sort of knowledge has to 
do, not with what we know about the proposition within an inferential network but with knowledge 
of content and therefore knowledge of warranted assertibility. So unless we think of sense as 
determining reference it will be impossible to manifest what our predicative knowledge of a term or 
statement consists in because this is exactly the sort of knowledge which knowledge of sense 
consists in. Manifesting an intimate knowledge of the content of a term or statement is a 
requirement to establishing its meaning. (Recall that it is not being denied that some sort of 
communication can take place by referencing alone. This is the sort of communication that allows 
us to deliver or take meaning of a more superficial kind- in that we all understand and agree that we 
are referring to the same thing and that the truth of a particular statement, using referencing alone 
will depend, hypothetically and unsubstantively, on whether or not it corresponds to the facts.) 
98 
If the use of our language (linguistic practice) is such that it merely requires us to make tautological 
statements we need look no further than referencing as a way to establish meaning. This is because 
it is merely necessary that we all understand which term denotes which object and whether or not 
such terms can, in a rule following sense, stand in a valid inferential relation to each other. In other 
words, if it is possible that "god" can stand in a positive, predicative relation to "loving" then we 
can legitimately conclude that the sentence "God is loving" is a valid sentence. Undoubtedly, this is 
a logically valid sentence and quite possibly its use within a network of inferential relations (such 
as an argument for God being loving) could be valid too. What is under dispute, however, is that if 
we want to use this sentence in a more than logical manner- in other words, if we are asserting 
something about an actual property of the actual entity, God- then we need to make an appeal to 
sense. It is this aspect of meaning which Dummett refers to as having an inductive basis. It is only 
in this way that we are able to manifest a more intimate knowledge of the terms we have employed. 
It is now no longer only a question of correct referencing and valid reasoning. When we want to 
say something about an object existing in a contingent and empirical world the truth (not validity) 
of the proposition is going to depend on more than just rule following considerations and truth 
transference across truth tables. Of course, it could be argued here, regarding moral properties, that 
it is not the claim that these properties are of the objective or empirical kind and that insisting on an 
inductive basis is inappropriate for the truth of moral claims. In hoping to side step the requirement 
of an inductive basis by denying that inductivity is appropriate for accessing moral facts the 
challenge just becomes an epistemological and metaphysical one: what then exactly are moral facts 
(when they seem more and more like moral Virtue in the Greek sense) and how will we know them 
in an a priori, for surely this is the manner in which we are to access such knowledge, fashion? 
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It should be more evident now that at the foundation of this whole argument for moral language is 
the nature of moral facts. It is the nature of such facts and the definition of truth that will settle the 
issue of indeterminacy. And it seems that, until it has been settled in a satisfactory way (in a way 
that, for instance, there is agreement about what moral facts are) we should accept that we have in 
moral language, according to classical logic, a case of the excluded middle which should not be 
excluded. The reason why the Principle of Bivalence and, therefore, the law of the excluded middle 
has been so pervasively successful is that the primary aim of philosophy has always been to say 
things about the world by way of valid reasoning. For this reason it has always been assumed that 
statements must either be true or false because truth or falsity have been somehow equated to 
validity or invalidity. It is assumed that, like mathematical statements, which can only be either true 
or false (although, even this is contentious), other statements must be the same. But it may transpire 
that we can only understand mathematical statements because of their content. That is, we only 
understand what the sentence "7 + 13" is because we are capable of grasping the sense of 7 and 13 
and (+). Philosophy has attempted to do mathematics with words, concepts and ideas- forgetting 
that these things actually make reference (or not) to objects in and properties of the world. It may 
be easy to squeeze concepts into perfectly logical sentences but it seems wrong, in a very serious 
way, to assume that a logically valid sentence (or the conclusion of a valid argument) must be 
saying something true about the world because it is logically true (valid). 
It seems, therefore, that factualist language (our assertoric linguistic practice) gives rise to another 
type of logic because the quantifiers used in assertions cannot always be settled with an ascription 
of a determinately true or false status. Barwise and Etchemendy in The Language of First-Order 
Logic claim that existential quantifiers, which are those symbols used to express existential claims 
(1993; 116), are used when we want to say something about a limited or finite group of objects or 
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properties. Dummett claims that finite sentences, such as those quantified existentially, make 
reference to a surveyable domain of facts which would provide the knowledge of what it would 
take for that statement to be true (1977; 6). 
When we are faced with a sentence which is quantified universally (those which would be making 
reference to "everything", "each thing", "all things" and "anything" - 1993; 116) we have no 
capacity to survey every instance of the instantiation of that sentence (1977; 6). In such a case it too 
is inappropriate to assume that this sentence necessarily must have a determinate truth value 
because the speaker is incapable of settling a determinate value for "all" and "everything". Using 
the example of mathematical sentences as universally quantified, Dummett puts forward the 
possibility that mathematical sentences (or sentences notated in the language of first-order logic) 
may, in fact, have content (1977; 3). In other words, it could be the case that mathematical 
sentences too possess content or truth conditions to which they must correspond in order to be true. 
This entails that they cannot just be true by way of logical/mathematical proof alone. (Of course it 
is assumed, by mathematical Platonists, that mathematical statements do have content of a very real 
and mind independent kind, but this assumption seems wrong in cases where we lack evidence. 
Hence, the importance of adopting a metaphysically neutral position where we lack substantive 
evidence.) In the light of our previous discussion and argument in favour of an evidentially 
constrained notion of truth we simply have not determined whether or not mathematical entities 
exist and so it leaves our mathematical or logical language in a position of indeterminacy. But this 
is only the case if mathematical assertions are seen to be denoting real objects. If it is the case that 
mathematical sentences have content then such sentences would stand in need of further proof- and 
cannot be used or conclusively resolved within a closed referential system. If mathematical 
statements are not seen as denoting real objects but are just formal notations of constructs which 
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stand in mathematical inferential relationships to each other then the meaning of such statements 
need not be indeterminate. And this is because they are not making claims to the sorts of truths 
which cannot be settled. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to save the meaning of moral propositions by claiming that moral 
propositions only make reference to constructs which stand in some sort of referential relationship 
to each other. Why not? Because this simply is not what speakers do when they make moral claims. 
It seems that the problem which arises for indeterminate [universal] quantifiers must arise, 
similarly, for logical constants. The grasping of logical constants, or connectives, like disjunction 
("or") and conjunction ("and"), cannot solely consist of a grasp of its role in inference because the 
aim is that these constants obtain meaning by being used in actual sentences with content. In order 
to know whether a sentence has a determinate truth value we need to be able to have an intimate 
knowledge of the sense of that sentence and this includes knowledge of whether these connectives 
hold true under the proposed conditions. Dummett claims that the meanings of these constants are 
determined by the contribution which they make in determining the correctness of an assertion and 
not directly to the validity of inference (1977; 363). So, if I take a sentence such as: "Either I must 
commit to the immoral cause of communism or I must accept that I have been a traitor to my 
country", it becomes quite evident that the truth of such a sentence can only be established once 
further proof (beyond establishing the logical validity of such a sentence and its role in other 
inferential networks) has been obtained. This proof will have the onerous task of showing that 
communism is immoral and that one would be a traitor to their country if they did not take up the 
causes of that country despite the fact that the particular individual may think the cause immoral. 
Added to this burden of proof it would also have to be shown, in a substantive manner, that this 
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disjunction implies a real dilemma. And this will depend on the actual truth of the two simple 
sentences within this complex sentence. The question must arise then: If the rules of inference 
cannot alone serve to determine the meanings of logical constants and that truth is, thereby, not just 
a matter of validity, then what exactly is the nature of truth in order to contribute to meaning in a 
significant way? 
What kind of "proof' is being referred to when we are speaking about "proof beyond that of 
logic? If (1) sense is a salient ingredient of meaning and (2) the sense of a term is derived from an 
intimate grasp of what is understood in using the term and (3) an intimate grasp is not one which 
can be captured a priori because there is nothing necessary (it is being assumed, in a Humean sense, 
that the only things which can be grasped a priori are necessary truths) about it then the sort of 
knowledge which we refer to when we ask for an intimate grasp of the content (sense) of a sentence 
must be a posteriori. We have established that the logical validity of a sentence would, quite 
evidently, be derived from an a priori knowledge of the rules of inference and what these determine 
about a particular claim and its role within an argument. However, if we want to know whether that 
sentence is really denoting something true about the world (corresponding to the facts) we must 
surely be operating on the level of the contingent. When we want to know whether or not it is 
actually the case that communism is immoral, or whether we are a traitor to our countries when we 
do not align ourselves with the causes of that country, we need to see what the facts are. And these 
facts have been shown not to be of the analytic kind. They simply must be (if there are any such 
facts at all) of the contingent kind. However, knowing that the facts which contain the sense of a 
sentence are not necessary facts does not entail, a priori, that there, conclusively, are or are not such 
facts available. 
103 
What happens when some of our claims need further epistemic support in order to be true? And is 
the case for moral language? If it is the case that we derive meaning from what we know would 
make our claims true (and this, in itself, does not seem to be controversial) then the above problem 
for truth will directly bear on meaning. This problem of further "epistemic support" and also how 
we are to think of truth itself will also bear directly on what we take meaning to be. 
How, exactly, then are truth and meaning related? According to Dummett the grounds for an 
assertion must be available and these grounds must be able to legitimate conclusions and 
consequences. This entails that, if we want to make a posteriori claims, we must be able to warrant 
such claims from a posteriori grounds. The consequences must be in harmony with the conclusions, 
and this does not refer to logical entailment. What it means is that an a posteriori epistemic position 
only warrants an a posteriori conclusion. Dummett, according to Weiss, refers to this as "harmony" 
between grounds and conclusions (2002; 107). I, once again, take it to be a fair conclusion in the 
light of the manifestation requirement, that a limited legitimate appeal to the Principle of Bivalence, 
sense determining reference and that meaning cannot be derived from hypothetical truth conditions 
in the absence of evidence, that truth should be epistemically constrained. In other words, to speak 
of truth as evidence transcendent counters every intuition we have about our use of assertoric 
language, and the commitment to content which this implies, as well as results in theoretical 
inconsistencies (such as concluding necessary truths from contingent relations of ideas and 
concepts and states of affairs). 
One serious problem arises for the Dummettian notion of an evidentially constrained truth. If it is 
so that sentences acquire meaning by that which makes them true (which most theorists agree on), 
and if indeterminate content cannot yield truth because truth is evidentially constrained, then it 
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cannot also be the case that indeterminate sentences can have meaning. So, a sentence like: 
"Communism is immoral", because, as far as I know, there are no facts available to determine the 
truth or falsity of this sentence, this sentence then is, formally, meaningless. But Crispin Wright's 
notion of minimal truth and superassertibility may [or may not] successfully give us a way to 
legitimately retain meaning for discourses such as those mediated by, for instance, moral language. 
In Truth and Objectivity Wright asks how we can hold that a discourse is truth apt but at the same 
time acknowledge that the contents are not knowable (1992; 11). This is easily done for those who 
take truth to be evidence transcendent. But the claim is that an evidence transcendent notion of 
truth is problematic for factual language because, firstly, we expect evidence in support of our and 
others factual claims and, secondly, because we assume, a priori, that there is a distinction between 
facts and non-facts and evidence seems to be the natural place of delineation. In other words, 
understanding legitimate factual propositions as warranted assertions, we are a priori committed to 
some features which will deem a discourse as truth apt. Wright makes a case for minimal truth 
aptness. He suggests that any discourse can count as truth apt in which it is possible to define 
predicates with the features highlighted by minimalism (1992; 27). Now, it is unnecessary to delve 
into too much detail here as we have, to quite a large degree, already discussed Wright's notions of 
minimal truth aptness (based on metaphysical neutrality) at the beginning of this chapter. 
All that is needed here, then, is a reminder of how adopting a metaphysically neutral position and 
an evidentially constrained notion of truth, in an attempt to grapple with how we acquire meaning, 
may allow us to overcome the problem for meaning which arises from indeterminacy. 
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Let's see exactly how Wright goes about defending an epistemic notion of truth and what this 
means for the meaning of indeterminate discourse: Wright rejects the notion that truth is 
coextensive with warrant if warrant is construed as an ideal information state (1992; 38-40). What 
he means is that truth is not the analytical equivalent of warrant (is not synonymous) if warrant is 
seen as an information state which remains a hypothetical ideal (something like what is proposed 
by the Correspondence Principle). Wright's reason for this is that there may be ideal information 
states which still cannot yield truth about certain sentences: Putnam assumes (1992; pp 40- 41) that 
under ideal epistemic conditions one should always be able to either prove a statement or its 
negation. Wright denies this for reasons of indeterminacy, which we have already discussed 
extensively; it may be the case that not all our sentences make reference to content which we can 
know. So even if our knowledge is ideal it is being claimed that the metaphysics in question may 
not cooperate. (It should be noted by the astute reader that content has been eliminated as a reason 
for indeterminacy. We have previously denied that an absence of certain states of affairs can render 
a claim indeterminate. An absence of things in reality, if proven to be absent, always makes the 
corresponding claim false. But there are cases, and this is the point, in which it has not been 
possible to prove either the absence or presence of facts.) 
So what does this mean for discourses such as moral discourse? An appeal to ideal epistemic 
conditions will not be very useful because truth, being a substantive quality of a sentence, must not 
be hostage to idealised conditions for determining it. Wright speaks about, and stands in agreement 
with, Dummett's notion of an epistemically constrained notion of truth based on the semantic 
requirements of manifestation and acquisition (1992; 60). He equates this to superassertibility as a 
model for truth since superassertibility is to be construed as: P is knowable —• P is superassertible 
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(1992; 58). In other words, in order for something to be superassertable (true) it must be possible 
"to alight on the indefeasible state of information that makes it so, and then the accumulative 
inductive grounds for identifying it as such" (1992; 61). This, however, does not resolve the issue 
we seem to have with the indeterminacy of moral statements and what this implies for the meaning 
of moral language. And this is because there do not seem, at this stage, to be any inductive grounds 
for moral truths. In fact, if we are right about truth being an epistemic notion this does not bode 
well for indeterminate discourse. But, and this is what we're looking for, Wright says of 
superassertibility that it also serves as an internal property of a sentence, or as a projection of the 
standards which inform the assertions of that discourse (1992; 61). And this, supposedly, is how we 
may continue to regard our moral language as meaningful- because it is superassertible by its own 
internal standards for warrant. In other words, the knowledge which will entail the 
superassertibility of moral claims is derived from a knowledge which is informed by the discourse 
itself. This means that we may make claims to truth provided our sentences are coherent, 
consistent, grammatically correct and asserted within an established discourse, adhering to the 
norms of that discourse, for which it has been acknowledged that we more often than not do track 
the facts. 
Wright believes that these are minimalist conditions, and that such conditions are consistent with 
the notion of superassertibility, which he has set in place to allow discourses, such as moral 
discourse, to be fit for the project of stating truths without needing "metaphysical underpinning" 
(1992; 204). This is, not surprisingly, consistent with what Wittgenstein, according to Paul 
Johnston, would have said about the fact that there simply is no independent judgement available 
for moral claims (1989; 143). Johnston explains that talk about moral discourse in a way which 
subjects it to the same standards as empirical discourse results in creating an "unduly mysterious" 
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subject matter out of moral propositions (1989; 152). The problem that this leaves us with, and that 
cannot be ignored, precisely because of manifestation and acquisition, is that we use our moral 
language in an objective sense. We use it in such a way as to assume it can meet the 
"inappropriate" standards which should, according to Wittgensteinian theorists, be limited to 
certain other discourses only. The problem then emerges: Wright's internal (not to the subject but 
to the standards of the discourse itself) superassertibility cannot give an account of our "objective" 
use of moral language and this is a particularly devastating flaw for a theorist who premises 
arguments about meaning on the notion of use. It just seems right that we must either commit to 
moral language not being able (being at present in an epistemically indeterminate position) to 
achieve the sort of objective truth and meaning it claims to or we must change our standards for 
what warrants assertion of facts. I am, therefore, not convinced that minimalism about truth solves 
the problem that indeterminacy raises for meaning. If minimalist truth (which emerges to be merely 
a sort of grammatically based platitude for those who want certain discourses to have determinate 
truth value despite the fact these cannot do so within an epistemic notion of truth) saves moral 
discourse- because moral propositions can be grammatically correct- then we surely can only save 
moral discourse in a minimal way? Minimalist truth merely results in a minimalism about meaning 
(1992; 231) and this just sidesteps the important fact about use (which in the case of moral 
language is hardly minimalistic). I propose that the argument for an epistemic notion of truth seems 
to be beyond reproach if we accept that sense does determine reference and that manifestation is a 
genuine semantic requirement. This entails that meaning is determined by the conditions under 
which a sentence is verified (because the truth which determines the meaning is epistemically 
constrained). It should be very apparent that the thesis of meaning being determined by verification 
conditions is in no way inconsistent with the thesis that meaning is determined by use. This is 
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because we have only been able to conclude that meaning is determined by verification conditions 
because of what we know about our use of factualist language. If we are going to remain loyal to an 
evidence constrained notion of truth we simply have to question Wright's internal 
superassertibility. The problem that indeterminacy and epistemic notions of truth raise for moral 
language must simply be addressed some other way. Minimalism cannot address these without 
compromising what we know about our use. 
The choice seems to be that we adopt a revisionist stance about our actual use of moral language or 
our notions about truth and whether truth should maybe be construed as minimalistic or even as 
evidence transcendent. But this, of course, would merely raise other problems- some of which we 
have already addressed. 
Section 3: Semantic anti-realism 
For those who are convinced by the fact that truth should be epistemically constrained (at least for 
assertoric language) and that, therefore, if the meaning of a sentence is determined by what would 
make it true, meaning should be determined by verification conditions- anti-realism may be the 
preferred semantic theory. What follows demonstrates the distinctions between, not only realism 
and anti-realism, but also what exactly is meant by semantic anti-realism. This thesis is only 
concerned with defending semantic anti-realism as it is pivotal to the whole argument that any 
metaphysical assumptions, even those resembling some form of constructivism or idealism, are 
categorically denied and this is partially what qualifies semantic anti-realism. 
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Dummett maintains that it is important that the sequence of theorising about meaning should start 
with theories about meaning itself. Then depending on what has been established about how we 
derive meaning this will inform which semantic theory, realism or anti-realism, we should endorse. 
This chapter, following from the first, has been concerned with showing that our use of assertoric 
language, when making moral claims, requires that we adopt a verificationist theory about 
meaning. The idea has also been to argue for all factual language being subject to the same theory 
about meaning. The conclusion about truth in assertoric linguistic practice is that it should be 
evidentially constrained as we expect to have evidence in support of our assertions and also 
because it makes theoretical sense that, considering the practical nature of our linguistic behaviour, 
we do not characterise truth by a hypothetical principle such as the Correspondence Principle. 
There are theorists who maintain that there exist mind independent properties, such as moral 
properties or colour, or mind independent objects, ranging from common sense objects such as 
chairs and tables to more problematic objects such as Forms (in the Greek sense), souls, 
mathematical entities and a God or many gods. Many, but not all such theorists maintain that we 
can say true things about such properties and objects without having knowledge of them. In other 
words, for those who do maintain that we can say true things without having knowledge about the 
facts will hold that truth is evidence transcendent. Now a description like the one I am offering 
here, needless to say, loses all the complexities and sophisticated combinations of ideas which do 
exist among philosophers today. But the important thing, for now, is to observe that this position is 
characterised by two separate aspects. The one aspect is its metaphysical commitment and the other 
is its particular views on knowledge and truth. Crispin Wright describes one of these positions by 
noting that its metaphysical commitment is of the modest kind as it acknowledges that we, as 
subjects, are not responsible for the existence of what we understand as the natural world (1992; 1). 
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The other view, which has it that we can say true things about this mind independent world without 
an appeal to evidence, he claims is presumptuous (1992; 2). This position, broadly and crudely 
described, is what we know as realism. 
There are also theorists who take it that much of what we take to exist independently of us is, in 
fact only projections of our mind. In other words, such theorists will qualify their metaphysical 
commitments as denying the mind-independent existence of properties and objects. Now there 
currently are very few theorists who endorse a global denial of the mind-independence of objects 
and properties. Usually theorists limit such views to specific areas of investigation, such as the 
projectivist theorists about moral properties. Such theorists may identify themselves with the anti-
realist project or not. An alignment with the anti-realist camp may depend on whether the theorist is 
also committed to some of the other theses which are associated with anti-realism. (These we shall 
discuss shortly.) This position is generally known as idealism or constructivism. 
Then you get theorists who have no (initial) metaphysical commitments of any sort. In other words, 
such theorists will hold that we simply must not begin our philosophical investigation presupposing 
anything metaphysical. We may conclude some things about a metaphysical state of affairs, but 
only after we have subjected our reasoning and language in general to some very stringent set of 
criteria and conditions for truth. In other words, we are simply not warranted in drawing certain 
conclusions about the world, even if there is a chance that it may be correct, if we have not met 
these conditions for truth. These conditions are usually characterised by a very strong focus on 
epistemic norms for warrant. These norms, more often than not will inform how we determine 
meaning and how we are to make sense of our language. It is this position which will promote 
epistemic notions of truth, and verification as a criterion for meaning. It should be observed that 
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this position is predominantly posed against the epistemology and particular definition of truth 
which realists endorse. It is for this reason that such theorists are called anti-realists, and it is this 
position exactly which is often referred to as semantic anti-realism. Not because they have any 
necessary metaphysical commitments but rather because they are opposed to realist notions of truth 
and justification. 
If we are right about meaning being determined by verification conditions then it seems that the 
correct semantic theory to endorse is that of anti-realism. It has always seemed a bit ironic that 
realism has used a term such as Correspondence Principle to define truth. The Correspondence 
Principle states that a sentence is true if and only if it corresponds with the facts. Now, it seems 
right that any theory which is premised on such a principle would be particularly concerned with 
the necessity for forwarding additional clauses about how we may know when our sentences do 
correspond to facts. But, instead of doing this realism forwards the notion of truth conditions, 
which are those conditions, if they obtain, that would make our sentence or proposition true. Yet, 
again it seems as if a further clause is necessary and particularly so for a position which expresses 
such confidence about the reality, and its mind independent existence, which our language can 
represent. Our assertions remain, by this view, hovering in the realm of the speculative and 
hypothetical. And this, as I have said, is particularly surprising for a theory which should be able to 
gain some sort of theoretical advantage from the fact that the entities and properties about which it 
speaks are not mere figments of our imagination and should therefore be accessible for the type of 
objective deliberation which is so prized by the professors of realist doctrine. 
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It has always been my contention that realists would be better realists for being semantic anti-
realists. And this should be relatively easy if they are right about their particular metaphysical 
commitments. 
Endorsing a verificationist theory about meaning simply must commit one to the form of anti-
realism described above. Dummett calls this position semantic anti-realism and this term seems to 
be able to successfully distinguish this position not as a metaphysical theory but rather a theory 
which concerns itself with meaning. Acceptance of metaphysical indeterminacy and the 
implications of this for epistemological theories, a rejection of the Principle of Bivalence and the 
law of the excluded middle, an endorsement of verification conditions as opposed to truth 
conditions as well as proposing that truth be epistemically constrained are all positions which will 
qualify a philosophical position as anti-realist. For these reasons, if we are right that meaning is 
determined by verification conditions, anti-realism must also be right. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Another challen2e for Verificationism: Is Expressivism right about moral language? 
The following chapter will address the second significant challenge to verificationist theories about 
meaning relevant to this project. (The first having been addressed in Chapter 1: Has the 
Verification Principle rendered itself meaningless by its own standards?) Chapter 6 will address the 
possibility of moral language not being genuinely assertoric. This chapter will use, as an opponent 
to a verificationist thesis about meaning, one of the most convincing and well established theories 
forwarding an anti-thesis; Expressivism. Section 1, while outlining what exactly Expressivism 
maintains, will argue that expressivist theories must concede that they are metaphysically loaded 
which makes them guilty of circular reasoning in the way, and for the same reasons, outlined in the 
previous chapter. The reason why it is claimed that expressivist theories are metaphysically loaded 
is based on a central premise of expressivist theories; that the moral predicate cannot import any 
additional factual content to a proposition because there simply are no such moral facts (no truth 
conditions). Section 2, will look then at whether or not moral propositions can be regarded as being 
assertoric. It will be argued that, if we do not assume anything about a metaphysical state of affairs, 
which we should not assume in the event of a complete lack of evidence for or against the existence 
of moral facts, it seems wrong to think of moral propositions as not genuinely assertoric with some 
potential for truth (even if, at present, indeterminate). The claim will be that it seems right to take 
moral propositions at face value; which is that of being assertoric. But it must be cautioned that the 
implication of accepting this position is not that moral language can and does represent moral facts 
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just because it is assertoric by nature. It seems, it will be argued, that if moral truth is indeterminate 
because evidence for or against moral facts is unavailable, the meaning of moral language must 
also be indeterminate. 
Section 1: Expressivism as metaphysically loaded 
The question to lead us then is whether or not Expressivism is or is not guilty of an unjustified 
metaphysical presupposition in saying that there simply are no such things as moral facts and for 
this reason to claim that moral language is not genuinely assertoric. Wright says of Blackburn that, 
and there seems to be no good reason to think that he may be misrepresenting Blackburn: "And it is 
his unspoken assumption that it is only in so far as a discourse serves to depict what is within the 
Cup that its propositional surface may be regarded as unproblematic." (1998; 192). In using "his" 
Wright is referring to Blackburn and in using "the Cup" he means the cup of reality, in other words, 
the real world which a proposition aims to denote. This expressivist stance on legitimate, 
unproblematic propositional language makes apparent the positivistic roots which expressivist 
theories draw from. And here Blackburn gains my sympathy and undoubtedly would have the 
allegiance of almost any verificationist theorist as well. So why does Wright, being a 
verificationist, object to this claim? My suspicion is that Blackburn does not gain approval from 
Wright about this matter because his, Blackburn's, metaphysical claim that there are no moral facts, 
even though most probably true, cannot be shown (verified) to be so. It is my aim to argue that this 
means that moral truth is indeterminate but moral language truth apt. Simply put, there seems to be 
no evidence available to show that moral facts are absent from the "Cup of Reality" (1998; 192) 
and this means that we are simply obliged to assume that moral language may be apt for truth even 
though we may never establish the actual truth value of moral propositions. 
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Wright takes on Blackburn on many scores, some of which will be discussed further on, but my 
point will be the above: The truth value of statements within moral discourse is indeterminate. The 
reason for this is that there is no clear and convincing way in which we can manifest our knowledge 
of the existence or non-existence of the conditions which would make our moral claims (if they 
exist) true or false. We, quite evidently, cannot show, and this in some sense serves as a challenge 
for those who believe it possible, what these facts are that will either confirm or negate (verify or 
falsify) our moral propositions. And, any sort of proof which is forwarded will only be useful if it is 
congruent with our aim in making moral claims- in other words moral facts would have to be of the 
objective, traceable kind. A word of caution to the reader: It should be clear that the presence of 
moral facts would serve to make moral propositions either true or false (depending on how the 
propositions correspond to the facts). Proof of the absence of moral facts would render all moral 
claims false (those only stating simple moral propositions pertaining only to some moral state of 
affairs). But the inability to prove the existence and the non-existence of moral facts would make 
moral claims indeterminate. 
More to the point, however, our inability to manifest our knowledge of what the facts would be like 
that would make our moral propositions true or false and also, counter the expressivist, not being 
able to provide evidence for the non-existence of such moral facts it would seem wrong to say that 
moral language is not truth apt despite the fact that it has every syntactic characteristic it requires to 
be used indicatively. 
But a further argument is needed to show that moral language is genuinely assertoric. But more 
important than showing moral language to be assertoric is to make explicit the implications of this 
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fact; that moral language is subject to the same constraint as any other indicative language because 
of being used in this particular way. 
If we take it that moral discourse is indeterminate in truth value and yet truth apt it seems to leave 
our morality awkwardly suspended. There are many theorists who find this inconclusive and open-
ended view of moral language largely unsatisfactory. And, in the light of how important ethical 
behaviour and moral value are to people, it can be easily understood why such an open-ended view 
seems not to capture correctly what morality is to us as moral agents. And this, rightly so, should 
make theorists suspicious of accepting such an unsatisfactory view of moral truth. In theoretical 
terms it is often assumed that this sort of stance on moral truth is giving the debate away to 
Quietism (a view that there is not much to dispute or to resolve between metaphysical realism and 
anti-realism). Quietism assumes that an attempt to resolve the debate between whether or not we 
can establish conclusively that there are such things as mind-independent, moral facts (in the case 
of meta-ethics) is a misguided effort by metaphysicians and other types of philosophers. To some 
extent this view gains my sympathy, simply for the reason that it is hard to imagine what the 
ontology of such a thing as a mind-independent moral fact will be. And in the light that it seems 
hard to describe what we must be looking for it seems highly unlikely that we shall find the thing 
itself or be able to confirm its absence. (Refer back to the example of a "maximonis" in Chapter 4) 
However, some attempts, such as Wright's suggestion that we regard moral propositions as 
minimally truth apt and, therefore, capable of minimal truth, have been made as a possible way in 
which we can maintain some of our ideas about moral truth. However, it is not obvious that 
"'minimal truth" does not just result in another sort of counter-intuitive position because moral 
agents certainly do not think of their moral assertions as true because they are grammatically valid 
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and true by general norms internal to moral discourse. Moral language is used in a more objective 
sense and moral statements are assumed to be true in an absolute sense by the speaker. Hence, the 
existence of ethical dilemmas, disagreements about what is right and wrong between moral agents 
and antagonism between cultures about their varying value systems. 
Moral language poses to be doing more than what is permitted by minimalism, and this requires 
some metaphysical presuppositions. It seems that Dummett is right when he says that we are 
unwittingly and wittingly seduced by the metaphysical picture. Maybe it is for this reason that 
theorists, such as Ayer and Blackburn, say more than what is minimally permitted about moral 
language. Ayer and Blackburn, as we have seen, maintain that moral language has no truth 
conditions. Blackburn quotes and expresses assent to Ayer's view that the moral predicate (e.g. "It 
is wrong..." or "It is right...") does not add anything substantive to the factual content of the 
sentence in which it appears: 
"The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus 
if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money", I am not stating anything 
more than if I had simply said "You stole that money" in a certain tone of voice." (1984; 
167) 
When a theorist claims that nothing substantive is added by the moral predicate the reason most 
probably is that this theorist takes it that the moral predicate cannot track anything real or does not 
make reference to anything real. In the particular case of Ayer and Blackburn we know them to be 
proponents of Expressivist theories about meaning (in moral language). This means that the moral 
predicate is taken to be making reference to nothing more than a desire or passion or disposition of 
some kind. In more "expressivist" terms: The moral predicate is nothing more than an expression of 
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a feeling or attitude. Such a moral predicate is not asserting truly or falsely that something is the 
case. If there is not factual content for the moral predicate to import to the value of a moral 
proposition then it must mean, if truth conditions are states of affair in reality, moral propositions 
have no truth conditions. This undoubtedly is a metaphysical claim and serves as the reason why 
expressivists cannot regard moral language as apt for truth. The fact that expressivists may regard 
moral language apt for truth, not because it states but because it expresses, is, once again, missing 
the point about use. It simply is not the case that moral agents think of themselves as expressing 
sentiments and predispositions when they make moral claims. If this were the case there would be 
no contention around what is right and wrong. Moral agents think of themselves as saying 
something which is true enough that the morally relevant situation should be judged the same by 
any other moral agent confronted by the same set of circumstances. And this is not the same as a 
sentiment. 
When Expressivists claim that there are no moral properties, and therefore no moral facts, they 
must be saying something about the way the world is. Stating that reality is devoid of anything such 
as mind-independent moral properties is a statement in the same class as those saying that the world 
has no colour, or texture or temperature. So having secured the position that Expressivism does 
presuppose a metaphysical state of affairs, and that it therefore does not assume a metaphysically 
neutral position on which to base its semantic theory, we can look at exactly what the two theories 
have to say about the assertoric nature of moral language. 
119 
Section 2: The assertibility of moral claims 
Wright says in Comrades Against Quietism (1998; p 184): "It's a familiar phenomenon in activist 
politics that disagreements among closely related factions are often more intensely felt than 
disagreement with more radically opposed ideas, and are often pursued under the accusation of 
insufficiency of distance from the latter." His position about the relationship of verificationist 
theories and expressivist theories is that they are in many ways similarly characterised, not least, I 
expect, their affiliation to anti-realism about truth. But their positions on matters such as the 
possibility of truth in moral language nevertheless do differ in ways which make it"... worth trying 
to get these matters right." (1998; p 184) 
Blackburn objects to the notion that there should be "norms of acceptance and rejection of 
utterances of indicative sentences which exist for other reasons than that those sentences have truth 
conditions" (1998, p 159). Expressivist theories maintain that moral language is not genuinely 
assertoric because there is one necessary criterion for determining whether sentences are assertoric 
and that is that they have truth conditions. (We are assuming here that these are not quite the same 
sort of truth conditions forwarded by the realist camp: theoretical conditions would ensure the truth 
or falsity of statements.) Assertoric language is, quite simply claimed, by expressivist theories, as 
language which intends to be stating some sort of facts or to be representing reality. In the light of 
the above discussion about the expressivist position on the absence of truth conditions of moral 
propositions it can be assumed that Expressivism holds moral language not to be assertoric because 
there is no justification for seeing it as fact stating for the reason that there are no such facts (no 
things which can serve as truth conditions). This expressivist position suggests that there are 
reasons, beyond those of a syntactical nature, which delineate assertoric language from other sorts 
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of language and that this has something to do with the nature of the content of assertoric language 
which justifies it as being regarded as assertoric. But the notion of "content" allows, in itself, 
necessary a priori inferences to any such specifics about what contents are justifiably appropriate 
for assertoric language. In other words, specifying that only certain contents are appropriate for 
assertoric discourse, while unsupported by further norms, is not very useful. When, then, can an 
utterance justifiably be regarded as assertoric? In other words, what sort of "content" are the 
expressivists looking for? And, also, for our purposes, are moral claims ever justified in presenting 
its assertoric facade? 
Supposing that this contents-based view of assertion is accepted by expressivist and verificationist 
theorists let us look, first, at why expressivist theorists deny that moral claims are genuine 
assertions. One of the conditions which have to be satisfied in order for an utterance to be justified 
is that it is capable of truth. If moral language is judged not to be capable of truth this could be due 
to particular views on the metaphysics of moral reality but also could be due to views on truth 
itself. Most likely it will be regarded as a bit of both. 
Expressivism maintains that moral claims or judgements are not capable of truth because such 
claims and judgements have no truth conditions. Simon Blackburn makes it very clear (1984; 170) 
that expressivist theories do not maintain that because our moral utterances are expressions they 
have no truth conditions. This position would be guilty of circular reasoning because it is the very 
question about why utterances should be regarded as merely expressions (and not claims to truth or 
beliefs) which needs to be answered. This answer will inform the argument as to why such 
utterances ought not to be regarded as genuinely assertoric. 
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Truth conditions are those conditions in the world, matters of fact or other abstract states of affairs, 
which would make a certain utterance, if it corresponds to that state of affairs, true. Now when 
expressivism makes the claim that moral claims and judgements (referred to in the collective as 
moral language) have no truth conditions it is, undeniably, making a metaphysical claim. It is 
stating that the state of affairs which would make the utterances true, if they correspond correctly, 
does not exist. But what knowledge of the world, or our minds, informs expressivist theories in this 
way? The answer has much to do with projectivist theories about moral truth. Hume (1886; 
paragraph 24) spoke about "the mind's propensity to spread itself upon the world located outside of 
it". AJ. Ayer and Blackburn both propose that the moral predicate e.g. ".. .is wrong" or ".. .is 
good", of a sentence does not import any more information regarding the properties of the referents 
(1984; 167). The moral predicate is proof of the mind's ability and tendency to overlay a value 
neutral, a world of cold fact, with its own projections of value. 
It is, in times like these, helpful to compare the human mind, nervous system and visual equipment 
to that of a camera. Pretending to be a security camera, visualise the recording of a certain crime 
say, for instance, a theft. The camera will pick up all the features of the activity, say the insertion of 
a hand into a jewellery box and the extraction of a string of pearls there from. The camera may 
capture some photographic material of the person who is extracting the string of pearls. But 
nowhere will it be able to record the mind independent features which justify the assertion of the 
moral predicate "...is wrong". Nowhere will it have proof of having access to the referents of the 
term "wrong". The properties of the external world, the world independent of the human mind, are 
the events, colours, textures, movements and sounds (particular tones, pitches and rhythms) which 
have been picked up by the camera. However, when a person observes the recording which the 
camera has made, in other words the person is seeing exactly the same events as the camera- no 
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more and no less- they can and do make an interpretation of the events on many different levels. It 
may be tempting, at this point, to argue that the moral properties which we note are merely the 
resultant properties of the physical, observable properties. The problem with arguing in this manner 
is that it seems to be in breach of the Humean rule that we cannot derive an "ought" from an "is". I 
would prefer not to spend much time defending this rule here save to say that, to me, it seems like a 
fundamental rule of inferential reasoning and that the disregard of this rule can only place one in a 
precarious position of having to justify how one infers norms from value neutral facts. 
It seems that one of the levels on which the interpretation will happen is the level of value. So when 
a person, in other words the human subject, makes a statement like "It is wrong to steal a string of 
pearls" or "That was the wrong thing to do" this is a statement which, according to expressivist 
theory, is loaded with some sort of pre-sentiment. It is not reflecting, literally, what the features are. 
So when humans perceive the natural world it is always, by physiological necessity, going to seem 
like more than the matters of fact. The challenge for the scientist and philosopher (at least of the 
empiricist type) alike is to establish the exact place where these two things, fact and fancy, come 
apart. An expressivist, such as Blackburn, claims that moral language has no truth conditions 
because there is nothing, but a projection, for our language to represent. And, presumably, the 
argument goes that if there is no validating or supporting metaphysics (no objective truth 
conditions) then there is no justification for regarding moral utterances as assertions. A reminder 
may be needed here: it is not being claimed that false sentences cannot be assertions or that all 
assertions must be true. It is merely being said, by the expressivists, that without the metaphysical 
possibility of moral facts, moral language cannot be seen as genuinely assertoric. 
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Verificationism, by contrast, claims that moral language is genuinely assertoric. It would, for the 
same reasons that have been extensively discussed thus far, be a mistake to assume that verification 
theories, in maintaining that moral language is genuinely assertoric, also maintain that all or any 
moral claims are true. What verificationists, such as Crispin Wright, say is that language which 
meets certain criteria is assertoric by nature. Wright maintains that assertoric discourse should not 
be defined by the deep features of its content (in other words that it is about moral value), because 
this requires a metaphysical presupposition which may not be verifiable, but rather by certain 
syntactic features. And it does, indeed, seem as if identification by standards such as deep features 
of its content is going to call for explanations beyond what is offered by a linguistic analysis. To 
reject or accept a discourse based on the deep features of its content means that some contents are 
acceptable for assertoric language and others not. But then the problem is just batted elsewhere-
and maybe in a direction from whence it cannot return because to imply that any discourse is 
unjustified, based on its topic, seems like the wrong way to go about it. (Because this requires a 
metaphysical presupposition before the settling of which semantic theory- realist or anti-realist- is 
appropriate for this discourse.) So what are these syntactic features: 1. A claim is assertoric when it 
can be denied while making grammatical sense, 2. It is also assertoric if it can serve sensibly within 
a conditional, 3. It is assertoric when it can form part of a more complex statement which is 
subscribing to the correct use of connectives such as "and" and "or" and, of course, 4. When the 
language is an object of propositional attitude (1992; 75). 
What this means is that a statement should be able to retain its grammatical validity while being 
capable of being part of a more complex statement and simultaneously not jeopardising the 
grammatical validity of the complex statement of which it is a part. In other words, it should be 
able to be part of valid inferential reasoning. It also, on a more semantic level, needs to be making a 
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proposition which is being offered as an articulation of a personal attitude. This is a condition 
which expressivist theorists will also endorse. What all this entails is that assertions form part of a 
truth making activity- irrespective of what the outcome is bound or suspected to be. When we make 
assertions it is our intention to be stating something true. I am not, however, immediately 
concerned with the underlying metaphysics of the facts which the speaker is intending to assert. So 
we shall not commit the notion of truth to any particular metaphysics or content. What is important 
here is that assertions intend to represent, accurately (truly), some state of affairs- whether it be an 
internal state of affairs, such as sentiments and predispositions, or an external state of affairs, such 
as a game of cricket. 
What we have thus far, from the verificationist camp, is that assertions can be recognised by 
various characteristics, one of them being that the surface syntax and use in particular context set 
them up for being regarded as representational language. However, it is not enough to assume that 
because language intends to represent it, in fact, does. The question then arises: Under what 
conditions does language actually represent? It is for the reason that language sometimes does 
manage to represent and sometimes does not that we say that truth predicates are subject to norms. 
And when truth predicates are subject to norms then assertion, by implication, must also be. If 
assertions intend to, but do not always, represent some state of affairs there must consist a 
distinction between proper and improper use. Hale (1997; pp 271-308), in Realism and its 
Oppositions, claims that this supposition is central to the Acquisition theory about language which 
implies that if there were an independent or necessary link between reality and language (in other 
words between referents and references) there would be no such notion as linguistic competence. 
And not answering the Acquisition Challenge is in effect implying that language competence must 
be related to something other than "saying it right". This is because when the link, between our 
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language and the world it attempts to describe, has nothing to do with our cognisance of the world 
and our ability to use language, then competence (because "competence" surely refers to agent 
competence) is a redundant notion. Part of what we expect when learning a language is that there is 
evidence in support of our claims. If it isn't right that evidence must form part of the delineation 
between competence and incompetence then we would be justified in assuming that this distinction 
must be based on something else but the accurate reflection of the facts and how to recognise when 
this has been achieved. The fact that it is the case that speakers value evidence as an aspect of 
distinguishing competence from incompetence is the reason why truth predicates are subject to 
norms. Verificationism contends that "illicit kissing is wrong" is an assertion, and not just a 
predispositionally informed commitment, because there is an assumption, by the speaker, that there 
are conditions which would make this moral proposition true. In other words, the truth conditions 
would be the existence of some moral fact which the moral agent (the speaker) would recognise as 
a property of illicit kissing. Verificationist theory then continues by saying that, in order to 
establish whether or not the claim is determinately true, the truth predicate is subject to norms. 
These norms, e.g. manifestation of knowledge of when language actually does represent the facts 
and how this link is to be recognised, and the attempts we make to adhere to them in our linguistic 
practice, will aid the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate assertoric practice. 
Wright maintains that Blackburn is wrong in assuming that "literal descriptiveness is a matter of 
possession of propositional surface" (1998; p 194). He says that it is indeed a very important task 
for any anti-realist to show how "propositional surface may be disengaged from realist 
commitment" (1998; p 194) but cautions against it being done by assuming that the metaphysics 
cannot support the propositional surface. In a sense, if I have read Wright correctly, he is saying 
that propositional surface must be seen to remain unproblematic in the event of the metaphysical 
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issues being unresolved. This seems to echo very clearly the notions of moral language being truth 
apt despite the case about the metaphysics of so called moral properties and facts. He says this very 
clearly when he says that the work which we have regarding propositions, and what sorts of content 
we may be trading in when making moral assertions "could only start after we have made a 
distinction between cases where realism is acceptable, and the propositional surface consequently 
unproblematic, and cases where neither is so." (1998; p 194). "These are issues which are evidently 
at the heart of the metaphysical question, not things to take a stance on before starting work." 
(1998; p 195) Wright's criteria, which are basically syntactic by nature, for minimal truth aptitude 
seems to say that our moral deliberation can be part of correct inferential reasoning but that it 
would be very hard to argue for moral propositions being able to track facts of the kind which are 
claimed to have moral qualities. This sort of moral claim will not be settled either in terms of its 
truth value and its exact and legitimate meaning until the metaphysical work which must precede it 
is concluded- and this is so whether our inclinations are to deny or assume the existence of moral 
facts. 
Expressivism maintains that moral claims such as "illicit kissing is wrong" is not genuinely 
assertoric because there are no conditions under which such a statement could be true. (And 
minimalism does not aid us here either because minimalism does not reflect how we use oral 
propositions.) Expressivism, as we have established, presupposes a metaphysical fact about the 
world. Looked at like this, assertions are defined, by the expressivist, not by the use of the 
language, but rather by the inherent nature of the agent (his/her tendency to project value) and, also, 
the state of reality (which, according to expressivists, is characterised by an absence of moral facts). 
Verificationism, on the other hand, maintains that moral language is assertoric because it is used to 
make reference. But it is also because of this particular use that it is subject to norms. So, any 
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theory taking language at face value (in terms of its syntactical features and the manner in which it 
is in actual fact being used) and then also observes the truth predicate and the qualities thereof, as 
previously outlined by Wright, will be enabled to recognise assertoric statements and will see moral 
propositions as intending to state truths. Added to this, if no metaphysical presuppositions are being 
made, this language should be seen as apt for truth. The additional default clause must be that the 
truth predicate of truth apt discourse is subject to norms, if it attempts to represent the world. 
Theories which are interested in the relationship between language and the world it attempts to 
denote, will be hostage to the presupposition that we sometimes get it right and other times not. 
Such theories then have some sort of obligation to put in place rules for use. 
This, of course, does not logically exclude the possibility that we may, in fact, never or seldom get 
it right and that we are, as moral subjects, doing something else altogether when we use moral 
language. Both verificationism and expressivism acknowledge that the surface qualities of moral 
propositions are that of being assertoric. Verificationist theories, because not assuming anything 
about the nature of the world which moral language makes reference to, choose to regard such 
propositions as genuinely assertoric- as an articulation of actual beliefs that we have about (moral) 
reality. Expressivism is, however, concerned with why we speak in such a way and whether or not 
we are right when thinking ourselves capable of cognisance of moral facts even though there are no 
such facts. The reason for our realist type of language, according to expressivist theory, is that we 
are naturally convinced by our projection of moral value as facts. 
An important point to be taken here is that there is nothing to say, at this stage, that expressivist 
theories will never be shown to be right. This is because we have not been able to determine, 
conclusively, anything about the existence of moral facts and nor is it in any way impossible that 
128 
our observation of moral facts is due to us being faced by our own projections. But if it is true that 
we project moral value and there are no such things as moral facts then it must be correct that our 
moral language is not genuinely assertoric because it will just never be apt for truth. This is because 
it then has no valid truth conditions. But when language is taken at face value- as determined by its 
use and syntactic structure- it seems that the moral agent intends to be stating some sort of truth 
when making moral claims (deluded or not). 
As promised, I should like to end by briefly looking again at the implications for use, and meaning 
derived from use, set up by these respective theories. If verificationist theories are right about our 
moral language being assertoric based on the fact that it clearly is of an indicative nature (its 
syntactic structure) and the fact that we intend to use it to represent facts about the world (moral 
reality) then we have a situation wherein our use of it in this way is clearly not ever going to yield 
any conclusively true propositions. This is because the semantic value (whether the proposition is 
true or false) is not verifiable. We have therefore a situation of legitimate use of language (because 
it is syntactically sound and metaphysically open-ended) but within this legitimate discourse we see 
that we make mostly only indeterminate claims (because of moral claims being unverifiable and 
non-falsifiable). We see, therefore, how an evidentially constrained notion of truth (See Chapter 4 
section 1) results in a counter-intuitive position about moral agents never being able to say anything 
true, in the objective absolute sort of way in which they aim to, while making moral assertions. 
Minimalist truth cannot save moral discourse in this regard, save for the philosopher, because it is 
highly unlikely that we want to be stating minimal truths when making moral claims. In this sense 
it does seem, if meaning is derived from verification conditions for representational language 
(which is a requirement imposed by the natural use of moral propositions), that the meaning of 
moral propositions is indeterminate. Indeterminate meaning does not imply that moral language has 
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no meaning at all. It is merely the claim that moral agents cannot achieve what they have set out to 
do, stating moral facts, when using moral language. This inability to achieve our ends as speakers 
results in a situation wherein it is not clear what the answer to a question such as "What do you 
mean when you state it is wrong to vote for the Communist Party?" cannot have a conclusive 
answer. It is of course possible to answer that "I mean that it is wrong to vote for the Communist 
Party". And, it would be unnecessarily confrontational to deny that any listener, in command of 
English, cannot grasp the "meaning" of this answer. But, the point is that speakers are making 
claims greater than such a grasp. It is most likely that a speaker will have some sort of argument in 
support of this claim which has reasons based in assumptions about the moral properties of the real 
world. If such assumptions are part of the intended meaning then it seems problematic, to me, what 
state of affairs, which the speaker in question has supposed knowledge of, will settle the truth, and 
therefore the meaning, of a statement such as the one above. 
But Expressivism fairs no better in capturing our intuitions about our moral claims and what we do 
while making them. It simply is not the case that we regard ourselves as expressing attitudes and 
dispositions, even though the philosophers may be right, when we make moral claims. And if we 
would be willing to concede to something like this it would most probably still be found that we 
somehow believe that our personal and subjective attitudes and dispositions are the right ones, 
which means we are back at square one regarding the possibility of conclusive moral truth. It just 
seems that our intention to represent facts, and therefore our insistence on using moral language in 
an indicative manner, stands in some contradiction to what we are able to determinately and 
legitimately mean within moral discourse. 
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CONCLUSION 
The structure of this conclusion may either be the demise of the argument forwarded by this thesis 
or may, in the end, serve to strengthen its basic premises and conclusions. This is because it is the 
nature of deductive arguments that poor reasoning cannot be obscured by difficult technical 
language and complicated, dense justifications of philosophical notions and commitments. It has 
been my decision to lay bare the skeleton of my argument trusting that the reader will find it 
convincing even in this vulnerable form. In presenting it thus (as a series of deductive proofs) my 
aim, obviously, is not to convince the reader of the truth of the premises, and therefore the 
soundness of the arguments, but rather to allow the reader to decide whether, assuming the 
premises given are true, the various conclusions made can be logically inferred from these 
premises. In other words, the conclusion of this thesis sees a general claim to the validity of the 
argument presented. The assumption is that the truth of the premises forwarded by the following 
deductive proofs has been settled within the chapters of this project. 
(Please note that the conclusion of each proof has been numbered according to the numbering of 
the argument in which it occurs. I have included references to the parts of the preceding chapters 
where I have hoped to settle the actual truth of the premises to follow.) 
Argument 1 
PI: Speakers do not unconditionally accept each others' assertions as true (pp 59, 60, 64) 
P2: The conditions for truth is taken to be the evidence a speaker has in support of his/her 
assertion (pp 64, 67, 68, 72) 
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P3: Evidence is a state of affairs which must be manifestable by that speaker (pp 77, 78) 
C1: The manifestation of evidence is a condition for accepting an assertion as true. 
Argument 2 
P1: The manifestation of evidence is a condition for the truth of an assertion (from CI) 
P2: Conditions are constraints (pp 85, 86, 128) 
C2: The truth of assertions is evidentially constrained 
Argument 3 
PI: Statements which fulfil certain syntactic criteria (X) are assertions (p 124) 
P2: Moral statements fulfil certain syntactic criteria (X) (pp 127, 128) 
C3: Moral statements are assertions 
Argument 4 
P1: The truth of assertions is evidentially constrained (from C2) 
P2: The unavailability of evidence renders the truth of assertions evidentially unconstrained 
P3: Evidential constraint is a necessary condition for the determinacy of the truth of assertions (pp 
81,82,83,88,89) 
C4: The unavailability of evidence renders the truth of assertions indeterminate 
Argument 5 
P1: The unavailability of evidence renders the truth of assertions indeterminate (from C4) 
P2: There is no evidence available in support of the truth of moral statements (pp75, 76) 
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P3: Moral statements are assertions (from C3) 
C5: The truth of moral assertions is indeterminate 
Argument 6 
PI: The meaning of a statement is determined by [what is being represented and understood in 
using a statement] (pp 52-57) 
P2: [What is being represented and understood in using a statement] are the conditions which 
would make a statement true (pp 52-57) 
C6: The meaning of a statement is determined by the conditions which would make a statement 
true 
Argument 7 
P1: The meaning of a statement is determined by the conditions which would make that statement 
true (from C6) 
P2: The truth of assertions is evidentially constrained (from C2) 
P3: Moral statements are assertions (from C3) 
C7: The meaning of moral assertions is evidentially constrained 
Argument 8 
P1: The meaning of a statement is determined by the conditions which would make that statement 
true (from C6) 
P2: The truth of moral assertions is indeterminate (fromC5) 
P3: Moral statements are assertions (from C3) 
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C8: The meaning of moral assertions is indeterminate 
The conclusion forwarded in the eighth argument above represents the overall conclusion of the 
thesis: The meaning of moral assertions is indeterminate. It is conceded that such a conclusion 
is, in most ways, entirely counter-intuitive because it certainly seems to be the case that our moral 
language has "meaning" of a very definite kind to us. But if our intuitions were never permitted to 
be up for investigation there would be no need to think critically about anything. The point, and the 
central thesis of this project, is that our intuitions about truth (what we believe about "moral truth") 
and our intuitions about what we take ourselves to be doing when employing moral language and 
what moral language is, in fact, capable of stand at odds with each other. However, it is important 
that the conclusion is not misrepresented in any way and I therefore caution against the possible 
assumption that this thesis has proposed a general sceptical position about meaning, like something 
in the vein of Quine's doctrine about meaning (Wright: 1997; p 397). This project, as suggested by 
the title, has been an isolated study of moral language and the intention has been to forward an 
argument for why moral language, in particular, presents certain problems for meaning. The claim 
is: The fact that we expect evidence (of the objective, truth conferring kind) in support of our and 
others' moral claims, but can manifest none, is the reason why the meaning of moral claims should 
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